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THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF
NETWORKS
DR. HENRY FRASER*
ABSTRACT
The past 25 years have seen a ‘turn to culture’ in copyright scholarship.
This cultural turn has produced an expansive account of copyright’s
disadvantages with respect to qualitative cultural and political goals such
as: promoting democracy, individual self-authorship, expressive diversity,
and a more inclusive creative and discursive culture. A common view among
proponents of the cultural turn is that copyright stands in the way of the
democratization of creative and discursive spheres online. This article
challenges that view.
Online ‘free’ content economies—characterized by peer production,
decentralized selection, and peer to peer content sharing—have not lived up
to the hopes of cultural turn thinkers. I focus on structural matters
(structures of incentive and structures of power), critically applying
descriptive and normative frameworks of the cultural turn.
Proponents of the cultural turn have been concerned about copyright’s
role in concentrating cultural power. They should also be concerned about
concentrations of cultural and communicative power in ‘free content’
economies. If they were concerned that commercial incentives under
copyright regimes privileged bland and homogeneous content, they should
also be concerned about the troubling incentives at play in online economies
where free content is used to harvest user attention and sell advertisements.
This is not to say we should aim for maximalist copyright online. I show
that both expansions of exceptions and limitations to copyright, and
*
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measures that strengthen copyright owners’ exclusive rights, may entrench
problematic incentives and power structures both online and off. We should
therefore carefully assess how developments in law affect structures of
power and incentive in the creative sphere as a whole, whether they formally
‘weaken’ copyright or ‘strengthen’ it.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright pessimism and internet optimism
Pessimism about copyright, and optimism about the potential of the
internet to democratize cultural production, tend to go hand in hand. Over
the past 25 years, copyright scholarship has taken a ‘cultural turn’.1 Where
traditional copyright scholarship focuses on balancing incentives for
creativity against the need for access to works, the cultural turn is
characterized by concern with copyright’s influence on the quality and
character of culture. The cultural turn has produced an expansive account of
copyright’s disadvantages with respect to qualitative cultural and political
goals. These include the promotion of democracy, individual self-authorship,
expressive diversity, and inclusiveness in the distribution of power to shape
culture and discourse.2
The same body of literature has also produced a fairly rosy picture of
internet culture, especially ‘free’ content economies characterized by peer
production, creative remixing, decentralized selection, and peer to peer
sharing of content.3 Professor Yochai Benkler was perhaps the leading
1. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Copyright’s Cultural Turn, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1397–
1561 (2013).
2. See, e.g.: Anne Barron, Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom, 31 LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY 1 (2012); Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making of
American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2017); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF
NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Anupam
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Copyright’s Cultural Turn, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1397–1561 (2013); M. Chon,
Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006); JULIE E. COHEN,
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012);
ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (2015); C. J. CRAIG, COPYRIGHT,
COMMUNICATION, AND CULTURE: RE-IMAGINING THE COPYRIGHT MODEL (2006).; Niva Elkin-Koren,
What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2005); Brett M. Frischmann, Capabilities, Spillovers, and Intellectual
Progress: Toward a Human Flourishing Theory for Intellectual Property, 14 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 2 (2017); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the
Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-toAmateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951 (2004); David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 463–483 (2003); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004);
Neil Natanel, Copyright’s Paradox (2008); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s
Constitutionality, YALE L.J. 1–60 (2002); Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent:
Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101 (2008); M. Wong, Toward an Alternative
Normative Framework for Copyright: from Private Property to Human Rights, 26 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 775 (2008).
3. Some proponents of the cultural turn, such as Professor Netanel, have been more skeptical of
internet culture. See e.g. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395–498 (2000). Netanel has also offered impressive,
nuanced accounts of copyright’s role in promoting democratic civil society, even as it contributes to
problematic market hierarchies which have negative effects on freedom of expression. See e.g. Neil
Netanel, Is the Commercial Mass Media Necessary, or Even Desirable, for Liberal Democracy?,

THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF NETWORKS

2019

12/23/2019 12:03 AM

The Disappointments of Networks

5

exponent of this optimistic view (though his views have subsequently
changed).4 He wrote, in his important and impressive book on The Wealth of
Networks:
“By creating sources of information and communication facilities
that no one owns or exclusively controls, the networked information
economy removes some of the most basic opportunities for
manipulation of those who depend on information and
communication by the owners of the basic means of communications
and the producers of the core cultural forms. It does not eliminate the
possibility that one person will try to act upon another as object. But
it removes the structural constraints that make it impossible to
communicate at all without being subject to such action by others.”5

Benkler’s view (one shared by numerous cultural turn theorists of copyright)
was that networked peer production, and de-propertization of works online,
promised a culture that is more inclusive and democratic; more expressively
diverse; less susceptible to control and manipulation at a single source; and
more affirming of free choice and expression, than mass media culture
underwritten by proprietary copyright.6
Online free content economies have not, however, been living up to
their promise. Every month seems to bring another government report, news
story or book detailing the ills of the online world of information and
discourse.7 The public, globally, is becoming more aware of:
ORKING PAPER TPRC CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTERNET POLICY

(2001), http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0109092 (last visited Feb 24, 2014); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright
and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 THE YALE L.J 283–387 (1996). As a general rule, however,
culturally oriented theories of copyright have tended toward copyright pessimism and internet
optimism.
4. Regarding these changes, see below note 31 and accompanying text.
5. BENKLER, supra note 2, at 465.
6. See e.g. Hunter and Lastowka, supra note 2, at 1018: “The destruction of copyright industries
would be a terrible thing if, and only if, they represented the sole means that creative content could be
generated. As we have seen, however, amateur-to-amateur functions now provide individuals with the
opportunity to express themselves, and society has already benefited greatly from this expanded content
generation. The next few years promise to provide even greater opportunities for this sort of content. As
a result, society as a whole is likely to be better off if we allow for widespread decentralization of all
content functions.” See also, e.g.: LESSIG, supra note 2; Giancarlo Frosio, Re-Imagining Digital
Copyright Through the Power of Imitation: Lessons from Confucius and Plato, 5 PEKING UNIVERSITY
TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 55–106 (2017); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of
Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263–324 (2002);
Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: the Overlaoded Impact of
Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785–856 (2004).
7. See e.g. Frances Cairncross, The Cairncross Review: a Sustainable Future for Journalism
(2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-cairncross-review-a-sustainable-future-forjournalism (last visited Feb 15, 2019); Department for Culture, Media and Sport, ONLINE HARMS WHITE
PAPER (2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7933
60/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf./; RENEE DIRESTA ET AL., The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet
Research Agency: Independent Report to the US Senate Intelligence Committee; Rosie Perper, New
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•

the extreme concentration of wealth and power in the hands of
a few internet platforms;8
• exploitative and often unauthorized surveillance, harvesting,
processing and disclosure of personal data;9
• mobbing, shaming and cyberbullying on social media;10
• polarization and incivility in online discourse;11
• the proliferation of conspiracy theories and fake news;12 and
• high profile ‘hacking’ of democratic process and public
discourse through propaganda and provocation on social
media, skillfully couched in the vocabulary of ‘meme’ and
‘remix’ culture.13
This article explores some of these problems in online free content
economies, and the structural pressures underlying them.
In focusing on structural matters—structures of incentive, structures of
power— I am adopting a descriptive framework that is firmly rooted in the
cultural turn. That framework has a strong flavor of political economy.
Proponents of the cultural turn – Benkler and Professor Neil Netanel
foremost among them—have produced an impressive picture of copyright’s
role in organizing the production, dissemination and use of works; and
allocating wealth and cultural power as it does so.14 They have shown how
Zealand’s Privacy Commissioner Lashes Out at Facebook, Calling Those Behind the Company
“Morally Bankrupt Pathological Liars”, BUSINESS INSIDER AUSTRALIA (2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/new-zealand-privacy-commissioner-calls-facebook-morallybankrupt-pathological-liars-2019-4 (last visited Apr 10, 2019).
8. See e.g. Chris Anderson & Michael Wolff, The Web is Dead: Long Live the Internet, WIRED
(2010), http://www.wired.com/2010/08/ff_webrip/.
9. See e.g. Jaron Lanier, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS
RIGHT NOW (2018); Kevin, Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as
Fallout Widens, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html.
10. See e.g. Jon Ronson, Jon Ronson: How the Online Hate Mob Set its Sights on Me, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/dec/20/social-media-twitteronline-shame.
11. See e.g. Farhad Manjoo, Web Trolls Winning as Incivility Increases, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/15/technology/web-trolls-winning-as-incivilityincreases.html.
12. See e.g. Guardian Staff & Agencies, Washington Gunman Motivated by Fake News
“Pizzagate” Conspiracy, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/dec/05/gunman-detained-at-comet-pizza-restaurant-was-self-investigating-fake-newsreports?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.
13. DIRESTA ET AL., supra note 7.
14. See e.g. Y. Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the
Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245–1276 (2003); Netanel,
supra note 3; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free
Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000); NETANEL, supra note 2; LESSIG, supra note 2.
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strong copyright contributes to a troubling concentration of wealth and
communicative power in the hands of large corporate copyright businesses—
a concentration / inclusiveness critique of copyright.15 They also make a
blandness / diversity critique of copyright, which boils down to the charge
that copyright contributes to perverse commercial incentives which reward
bland, lowest common denominator content at the expense of more diverse,
controversial and creative fare.16
The more general insight here is that the political economy of
copyright—what Netanel calls its ‘structural function’—exerts an influence
on what works are created, what disseminated, by whom, for whom, and
under what financial and material conditions. Copyright gives rise to the
operation of a price mechanism. This, in turn, allows market forces and
hierarchies to shape the way in which rights to use works, and wealth derived
from the commercial exploitation of works, are allocated.17 As a
consequence it creates a set of institutional and cultural constraints which
shape the quality and the character of the creative sphere.18
But the same holds true for any system for organizing production,
selection, dissemination, consumption, exploitation and use of creative
material. However these activities are organized, a set of institutional and
practical parameters will come into play. These will shape incentives,
distribute wealth and power, create hierarchies of one kind or another, and
ultimately influence creative activity. Freedom (or relative freedom) from
the constraints of copyright is therefore not a sufficient condition for a
culture of uncommodified creativity that enhances individual flourishing or
effective, robust, respectful deliberation.
Indeed, disintermediation of content industries, and free circulation of
works plays a key role in facilitating troubling structures of incentive and
power online. Jaron Lanier sums up the structural conditions in the online
15. Copyright industries are characterized by supply side concentration and winner take all
markets. Under the auspices of copyright a small, vertically integrated group of commercial
intermediaries—publishers, record labels, film studios, and so on—has considerable power to mediate
what comes before the public. e.g. LESSIG, supra note 2 at 10, 73; NETANEL, supra note 2, at 110;
BENKLER, supra note 2, at 370-374.
16. See e.g. NETANEL, supra note 2, at 137; Ruth Towse, Copyright and Artists: a View from
Cultural Economics, 20 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS 567, 570 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright
and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000), 9; L. P. Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning
Incentives With Reality by Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection (2008),
http://works.bepress.com/lydia_loren/1/; Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use, supra note 14, at
379-380; Tushnet, supra note 2, at 115.
17. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the” Betamax” Case and its Predecessors, COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613 (1982).
18. Julie E Cohen, Copyright, Commodification and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, THE
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW (last visited Jan.
24, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=756484; COHEN, supra note 2, at 26.
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world of free content with characteristic wryness: “Sometimes information
is supposedly free but people are subject to weird surveillance and influence
with insufficient commensurate rights.”19 Oligopolistic internet platforms
such as social networks and search engines use free content to draw
individuals onto their platforms and take advantage of powerful network
effects.20 These platforms then use data harvesting and surveillance to
maximize the time that users spend on the platform; to sell advertising; and,
in some cases, to sell personal data that permits third parties secretly to use
powerful insights to influence individuals’ opinions, spending and political
outlook.21
Algorithms designed to maximize user engagement do not prioritize
diversity, individual self-authorship, inclusive distributions of
communicative power, or open, productive discourse and deliberation.
Rather, they have tended to produce ‘filter bubbles’, characterized by
addictive interfaces, and content that drives impulsive clicks, sparks outrage,
and corrals internet users into groups of like-minded interlocutors.22
In short, online free content economies have produced many benefits,
but they have also contributed to distributions of wealth and communicative
power, and conditions in the marketplace of ideas, which seem little better
than those for which scholars like Benkler criticized over-reaching
copyright.23
To say so, however, begs the question of how we are judging what is
‘better’. Here again, I wholeheartedly adopt the normative framework of the
cultural turn: the same framework underlying the concentration and
blandness critiques of copyright. Let me now set that framework out in a
little more detail.

19. Jaron Lanier, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? (2014), 246.
20. Jonathan Barnett, The Costs of Free: Commodification, Bundling and Concentration (2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2916859.
21. See e.g. Carole Cadwalladr, The Great British Brexit Robbery: How Our Democracy Was
Hijacked, THE OBSERVER (May 7, 2017), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/07/thegreat-british-brexit-robbery-hijacked-democracy. See also Julie Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the
Practical Inevitability of Law, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85–96 (2019).
22. Eli Pariser, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU (2011), 37ff. See
also Cohen, supra note 21 at 88.
23. Guy Pessach, Beyond IP — The Cost of Free: Informational Capitalism in a Post-IP Era, 54
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 225 (2017); Guy Pessach, Some Realism About Copyright Skepticism,
57 IDEA: THE IP LAW REVIEW 227 (2017).
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Critically applying the values of the cultural turn to online free
content economies
Cultural turn scholars assess copyright by reference to its effects on
culture, discourse, the information sphere and, ultimately, collective and
individual choice-making. Proponents of this turn to culture espouse a set of
goals that goes beyond copyright’s traditional goal of incentivizing the
production and dissemination of works of authorship, or maximizing utility
in markets for those works.
They draw heavily on deliberative democratic theory, and the human
capabilities school of development economics.24 The high-level goals that
emerge from these normative frameworks are democracy and selfauthorship. That is to say, proponents of the cultural approach argue that the
aim of any information policy measures, including copyright, is to facilitate
conditions in the sphere of culture and public discourse which:
• are conducive to productive democratic deliberation;25
• help individuals to cultivate their capabilities to the fullest, and
to author their lives with real autonomy;26
• or both.
Second order objectives follow fairly logically from these first order
commitments. Key among these are diversity and inclusiveness.
Both effective democratic deliberation and meaningful self-authorship
require diversity and inclusiveness in the information environment.
Individuals will not flourish, and nor will democracy, unless members of the
public are exposed to a diverse range of perspectives and aesthetics
24. The deliberative democratic paradigm characteristic of the cultural turn is rooted in what John
Dryzek describes as a ‘deliberative turn’ in political philosophy. See JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS (2002). The fundamental principle
underlying the deliberative democratic paradigm is that democratic decision-making will not be optimal
unless informed by robust, pluralistic, inclusive civil society and public discussion. See e.g. CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017) at ix. Human
capabilities analysis turns on the question: ‘what are people able to do and be?’ It is built on the work of
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. According to Nussbaum, the extent to which an individual lives
the good life is determined by the individual’s opportunities to realise their human capabilities to the
fullest. See e.g. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES (2011), 4; Martha Nussbaum,
Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9 FEMINIST ECONOMICS 33–59
(2003).
25. In copyright theory, the deliberative paradigm is best exemplified in the work of Professor
Neil Netanel who developed an impressive theory of copyright’s relationship to democratic civil society
over the course of a series of articles beginning in 1996, and culminating in a book on copyright and
free expression in 2008. See e.g., Netanel, supra note 3 and NETANEL, supra note 2.
26. See e.g. COHEN, supra note 2 at 12; BENKLER, supra note 2 at 273; Lessig, supra note 2 at
21-24; Beebe, supra note 2 at 344; O. B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation and
Context, 41 UC DAVIS L. REV. 477, 518 (2007); Margaret Chon, Postmodern Progress: Reconsidering
the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993).
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(diversity).27 By the same token, the distribution of power and opportunity to
shape and participate in culture must be reasonably democratic to ensure that
the public sphere is capable of capturing the perspectives and opinions of the
public (inclusiveness).28 The more open a decision or deliberation to multiple
perspectives and possibilities, the better formulated and richer it is capable
of being.29 This is true as much for individual choices (self-authorship) as
for collective (democratic) ones.
I have just given a snapshot of key normative concerns of the cultural
turn in copyright theory: self-authorship and deliberative democracy as high
order goals; diversity and inclusiveness as second-order means to these ends.
In the first prat of this article, I critically apply this normative framework to
online free content economies in order to reconsider the copyright minimalist
/ internet optimist outlook that I described above. I focus in particular to the
activity on dominant internet platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Google
and Twitter because the majority of individual internet users’ online activity
is mediated through such platforms.30
I point out a number of ways in which structural conditions in this
supposedly ‘democratized’ information environment produce serious
problems for expressive diversity, the inclusiveness of culture and,
consequently, individual self-authorship and democracy. I argue, for
example, that:
• as in mass media settings, attention, communicative power, and
the control over the means of selecting and filtering content, is
highly concentrated on the internet, which is bad for
inclusiveness; and
• online filtration tools like search engines and newsfeeds have
in certain ways reduced, rather than expanded, the range and
diversity of expression to which individuals are exposed online,
by producing ‘filter bubbles’ and promoting ‘group
polarization’.
The cyber-utopian vision of a vibrantly democratic, inclusive, expressively
diverse internet, delivering accurate information, high quality discourse, and
27. BENKLER, supra note 2 at 150-51.
28. Id. at 182. For more on the significance for individual capabilities of inclusiveness, ‘semiotic
democracy’ and opportunities to ‘play’ with cultural artefacts, see e.g. Fisher III, supra note 2 at 1216;
Beebe, supra note 2 at 245ff; Arewa, supra note 26 at 481, 505, 525; Cohen, supra note 18 at 143, 146;
Elkin-Koren, supra note 2 at 378, 399; Craig, supra note 2 at 33-35; Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of
Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumption, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 539 (2009).
29. Robert B. Horwitz, On Media Concentration and the Diversity Question, 21 THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY (2004).
30. Anderson and Wolff, supra note 8. For more data about the reach of these dominant
applications, see infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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rigorously and richly realized art, is inspiring. It even holds true in some
quarters of the internet – for example the incredibly rich universe of
podcasting. It does not, however, account for a raft of troubling dynamics
plaguing online free content economies in recent years.
To make these observations is, of course, not to dismiss the virtues of
the internet wholesale. On the contrary, the object of this article is to try to
direct our aspirations productively, to realize the potential of the online
content sphere to enhance democracy and self-authorship.
In any case, many cultural turn thinkers are by now well aware their
hopes have not been fulfilled. Skepticism about internet utopianism has
increased.31 Even so, it is worthwhile to assess critically the internet optimist
/ copyright pessimist view in its ‘pure’ form, as it found voice in the first
decade of this century, in order clearly and systematically to work out what
has gone awry. Benkler has recently observed that, rather than attaining the
freedom-maximizing internet he hoped for, we are shifting to an internet that
facilitates the accumulation and concentration of power in the hands of a few
agents.32 “If we are to preserve the democratic and creative promise of the
Internet”, he writes,
“we must continuously diagnose control points as they emerge and
devise mechanisms of recreating diversity of constraint and degrees
of freedom in the network to work around these forms of
reconcentrated power.”33

An important part of that process, painful though it may be, is to catalogue
and analyze the disappointments of networks.
More to the point, I will argue that many of the problems online are
connected with the structures of power and incentive that subsist in online
31. See e.g., Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145 DAEDALUS 18–32
(2016). Benkler now acknowledges (at 20) that “Several developments suggest that we are shifting to
an Internet that facilitates the accumulation of power by a relatively small set of influential state and
nonstate actors.” See also, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, John Perry Barlow’s Call for Persuasion Over
Power, 18 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 137–142 (2019); James Boyle, The Past and Future of
the Internet: A Symposium For John Perry Barlow, 18 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 1–4
(2019). See below note 46 and accompanying text for further discussion of Benkler’s gradually
changing views. Perhaps the most impressive work on this subject is Professor Julie Cohen’s. Cohen
has developed her thinking from emphasizing the need for free ‘play’ with creative content as
paramount, to now observing that internet users’ creative engagements with content now serves as raw
material for commercial exploitation by powerful online platforms. See, respectively, Cohen, supra note
2. and Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: the Legal Construction of the Surveillance
Economy, 31 PHILOS. TECHNOL. 213–233 (2018).
32. Benkler, supra note 31.
33. Id., 18.

THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF NETWORKS

12

12/23/2019 12:03 AM

CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.

Vol 19:1

free content economies - often characterized by the absence of strong
copyright, or attenuation of its enforceability; by peer to peer content
sharing; and distributed/decentralized methods of selecting and
disseminating works. It is not just that internet utopia has failed to manifest:
it is that the explosion of free content has been a big part of the problem; in
many, overlapping ways. This theme needs more emphasis and elaboration
in copyright scholarship.
Practical implications
The second part of this article sets out some practical implications of
my analysis. One of the consequences of the cultural turn has been a
tendency to focus on the need to expand copyright exceptions and
limitations, and to avoid expansion of copyright’s strength, scope and
duration.34 For example, the Australian Productivity Commission said in its
2016 report on copyright:
“Given the asymmetric nature of how [copyright] policy can be
changed, the Commission considers it is appropriate to ‘err on the
side of caution’ where there is imperfect information, and
consciously set weaker parameters in the way that rights are assigned,
used or enforced.”35

This is a government agency, framing copyright minimalism as the sober and
responsible outlook on copyright policy. The implication is that maintaining
strong copyright that would be the riskier course.
The analysis in this article suggests that weakening copyright and
expanding exceptions and limitations may also produce structural risks,
along with troubling asymmetries of wealth and cultural power. The
concentration and blandness critiques of copyright that I summarized above
might just as readily be applied to online free content economies. This has
something to do with the incentives that operate when works are distributed
and shared relatively free of copyright constraints, with the aim of capturing
user attention, harvesting data, and selling advertising.36 In other words, the
need for caution goes both ways.
Of course, drawing this conclusion does not mandate a knee-jerk recommitment to maximalist copyright online. The concentration and

34. See e.g. James Boyle, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2009),
http://works.bepress.com/james_boyle/26/ (last visited Oct 29, 2013); Giancarlo F. Frosio, Resisting the
Resistance: Resisting Copyright and Promoting Alternatives, 25 4 (2017).
35. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS - PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INQUIRY REPORT,
(2016), http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/intellectual-property/report.
36. For a sketch of this argument, see Pessach, supra note 23.
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blandness critiques of maximalist copyright (described above) are well
taken.
What we need is a unified picture of the structural and qualitative
challenges that affect the marketplace of ideas and the cultural and creative
spheres. Both copyright and non-copyright systems evince inclusiveness and
diversity problems, just as each has some advantages for inclusiveness and
diversity. In both copyright markets and online non-copyright systems,
perverse incentives reward bland or sensationalist content. Both online and
off, and in copyright and networked-peer-production systems, a small group
of powerful platforms hold a disturbing amount of power of the contents and
character of the marketplace of ideas.37
This observation has many implications, but I will focus here on one.
Developments to copyright law, whether they have the effect of formally
‘weakening’ or ‘strengthening’ the exclusive right, must be attuned to the
structural parameters that ultimately determine their practical effect.
The second part of the article is therefore devoted to illustrating how
such a mindset might inform our thinking about copyright policy. I will first
reflect on how certain expansions of the fair use exception in the US may,
perversely, compound existing concentrations of cultural and
communicative power, rather than alleviating them. I suggest that the
development of fair use doctrine needs to take into account the ways in which
dominant online platforms use the free circulation of works to harvest user
attention, and thereby increase their communicative power both with respect
to copyright owners, and to users.
Then, for the sake of balance, I will consider the structural drawbacks
of new developments in European copyright law. European Union legislators
are perhaps the first to take seriously the negative structural consequences of
‘safe harbor’ exceptions and limitations to copyright online. Article 17 of the
European Union’s new Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market
(the’ EU Copyright Directive’) purports to redress a ‘value gap’, whereby
online content sharing platforms profit from copyright infringement without
sufficient remuneration to copyright owners.38 I suggest that, while it does
focus on a structural power asymmetry, it risks compounding the
communicative power of:
• dominant online platforms relative to copyright owners;
37. See below, part 1.2.
38. Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market. The term ‘value gap’ was used in the initial
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital
Single Market—COM (2016) 593.
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dominant copyright businesses relative to users; and
incumbent copyright businesses relative to newcomers,
independent authors, and small-scale copyright businesses.
There are no easy answers when it comes to pursuing a copyright policy that
promotes democracy and self-authorship to the fullest. There will always be
trade-offs. What is clear, though, is that there is more to think about than the
traditional concern of balancing incentives to create against the need for
access to works: especially when we understand that free access to and
sharing of works, and not only strong copyrights, may contribute to troubling
incentives and hierarchies of wealth and communicative power.
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1. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS IN ONLINE FREE CONTENT ECONOMIES
1.1 Formal freedom is not enough
There has been a tendency to overstate the potential of a reduction in
the strength of copyright, especially online, to generate a ‘robust’ public
sphere, and to right the perceived wrongs of copyright-based, mass-mediated
culture. But a recent run of bad news about online platforms—disinformation
and misinformation, filter bubbles, echo chambers, invasion of privacy and
behavior modification for rent, election hacking—calls into question the
contention that online free content economies are better for democracy and
individual self-authorship simply by virtue of being freer of the constrains of
copyright.
Benkler, though very optimistic about the potential of networked
information economies, was, open to the possibility that changes in the
conditions and parameters characterizing our networked environment might
require a change in assessment of the merits of that environment. With
considerable foresight, he even contemplated the possibility of certain
internet services like Google becoming so powerful as to raise the prospect
of a new kind of mass media model. He was, however, fairly confident that
the pattern of information flow in digital networks is more resistant to the
application of centralized control or influence than was the traditional,
copyright-based mass media model.39 Unfortunately, his caveat about the
contingency of his assessment of the networked environment has proven all
too prophetic.40
How could this be? How could a system with so few formal constraints
on free expression and sharing of content fall short in meeting free speech
goals such as diversity and inclusiveness? Andrew Keen, a longtime critic of
cyber-utopianism, puts it this way: ‘distributed technology doesn’t
necessarily lead to distributed economics and the cooperative nature of its
technology isn’t reflected in its impact on the economy.’41 Freedom from the
constraints of copyright is not a sufficient condition for a culture that
enhances individual flourishing or effective, robust, respectful deliberation.

39. BENKLER, supra note 2 at 261.
40. See Benkler’s comments in Wil S. Hylton, Down the Breitbart Hole, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/magazine/breitbart-alt-right-steve-bannon.html
).
41. ANDREW KEEN, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER (Main edition ed. 2015), 33.
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Individuals’ and society’s capacity to translate formal freedom into real
self-authorship and democracy depends on contextual factors.42 Freedom is
relative. The substantive distribution of power and privilege, especially the
power to communicate and exert cultural influence, may constrain or
enhance autonomy just as much as formal prohibitions on certain kinds of
speech.43
If copyright is not dictating the dynamics according to which power,
resources and cultural influence are distributed, it is likely that some other
structural constraints are. In this part of the article, I will explore those
structural conditions and some of their consequences for democracy, selfauthorship, diversity and inclusiveness.
Professors Jonathan Barnett and Guy Pesach have each made important
contributions to the critique of online free content economies, and their
effects on political economy of creative culture. Barnett argued that a zero
priced content environment online produces winner-take-all outcomes. Rent
extraction opportunities, he contends, are shifted from content production
markets to curatorial platforms (such as search engines). Eroding copyright
protection for online content may result in pricing and output distortions in
markets for curatorial services (concentration problems) and, in the longer
term, content markets.44 The availability of free content is therefore not
‘free’ from a social point of view.
Pesach argued that the decentralization of cultural production and
distribution online, despite numerous benefits, has not proved an entirely
democratic development. He describes certain quarters of the online
information sphere as operating “beyond IP’, but suggests that these realms
suffer problems similar to those which afflict copyright-mediated content
industries. The means of deriving wealth and power from content (through
harvesting and analyzing data) is highly concentrated, and there is a problem
of content diversity.45 He attributes these problems in part to weakening of
copyright protection online.
42. BENKLER, supra note 2 at 141. Benkler is at his most impressive when dealing with the
relationship between freedom, constraint and autonomy. He writes, “If we accept that all individuals are
always constrained by personal circumstances both physical and social, then the way to think about
autonomy of human agents is to inquire into the relative capacity of individuals to be the authors of
their lives within the constraints of context. From this perspective, whether the sources of constraint are
private actors or public law is irrelevant. What matters is the extent to which a particular configuration
of material, social, and institutional conditions allows an individual to be the author of his or her life,
and to what extent these conditions allow others to act upon the individual as an object of
manipulation.”
43. See e.g. Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 674
(2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=744533.
44. BARNETT, supra note 20 at 20.
45. Pessach, Beyond IP, supra note 23 at 2030, 2044.
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Benkler has also revised his views on the ‘wealth of networks’. He now
considers that the ‘commons’ of the internet have not, in many cases,
produced more attractive forms of social relations.46 He identifies a number
of 'points of control' over online information sphere that have developed,
which run against the hope that the internet would reduce opportunities for
manipulation by one actor over another. Among these, he includes the
development of ‘big data’ big data and its use in behavioral control; and the
building in of digital rights management into internet standards. He says,
“Just as industrial manufacturers cheerfully emitted pollutants and
effluents into the commons of the air and water to externalize some
of their costs, so too are Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple
finding ways of constructing new bottlenecks above and below the
open layers, creating new toll booths and points of observation, and
using the “free” nature of the open parts of the infrastructure as low
cost input from which to then mine our “biopolitical public domain,”
as Julie Cohen puts it.”47

He still emphasizes the need to maintain decentralized, networked peer
systems in order to resist centralization and the ordering of state or market.
Indeed, he attributes responsibility for the woes of the internet in great part
to the resilience of markets and states and their ability to ‘domesticate’
decentralized, networked, user creativity.48
For the most part I agree with Benkler, but I think much more needs to
be said about the role of free content in that ‘domestication’ process. Some
commodification of creativity, in one form or other, seems to me inevitable
because the public derives value from creative content; and enterprising
businesses will naturally seek to leverage that value into profit, especially if
they can obtain the source of value for free. What is crucial is, as Benkler
says, is continually to assess how structures of power and incentive emerge
in that process, and how these structures affect the public interest.
In this part of the article, I will therefore add substantially to Barnett
and Pesach’s critiques, focusing in particular on the downsides for diversity
and inclusiveness associated with economies of ‘free stuff’ on online
platforms such as search engines and social media. I begin by considering
concentrations of attention, wealth and power online. Then I turn to

46
Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of Utopia?, 18 DUKE L. AND TECH. REV. 78–84
(2019), at 82.
47
Benkler, supra note 4646 at 81-82.
48
Id. at 83.
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problematic incentive structures and the ways in which they vitiate diversity
and inclusiveness in individuals’ experience of the information environment.
1.2 Attention is highly concentrated on the internet
Digital technology has dramatically increased individuals’
opportunities to create and share works. On the internet, active participation
in culture is more achievable than ever before.49 Professor Rebecca Tushnet,
for example, is very enthusiastic about the democratizing influence of fan
fiction on pop culture.50 Fans of films, novels and TV produce countless
derivative stories, exploring the fictional universes and characters that
fascinate them, and inscribing them with their own meanings. That is a good
in itself, and it clearly increases diversity and inclusiveness along one
dimension.
That benefit does not, however, necessarily translate into an increase in
the inclusiveness or diversity of the body of works that reaches most
individuals. Nor does the high rate of participation necessarily mean that the
power to exert a meaningful influence on culture and discourse is distributed
broadly or inclusively. Almost anyone can publish an opinion or other kind
of work without much difficulty, but these contributions will not carry much
influence if the public sees only a tiny fraction of them.51
The very absence of the traditional gatekeepers, the very size of the
internet, the very multitude of works disseminated digitally, necessitates new
tools for finding and selecting works. It is necessary to use various forms of
filtration to reduce the number of works to which an individual is exposed to
a manageable level.
Copyright minimalists were optimistic about the potential of digital
search and filtration tools to create a more dis-intermediated, decentralized,
democratized marketplace of ideas. Rather than commercial copyright-based
businesses (publishers, film and tv studios, record labels and so on) deciding
what is published and brought to the attention of the public, search engines
and social networks use algorithms to track user preferences and behavior,
and deliver results based on the so-called ‘wisdom of the crowd’. Search
engines like Google’s, for example, use an algorithm to rank web pages in
their search results based on, among other things, the number of incoming

49. Lessig, supra note 2 at 47.
50. Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY.
LA ENT. L.J. 651 (1996); Tushnet, supra note 28.
51. Matthew Hindman, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2008), 56
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links to that page.52 The algorithm is recursive, so that links from pages that
have, themselves, a higher number of links, weigh more heavily in deciding
the ranking of the linked page in search results.53
As a consequence, the public would no longer need to rely on either the
price system or a managerial structure for coordination in selecting works
worthy of their attention.54 This would supposedly democratize the selection
of works, and the decisions about which works to give attention to. The
combination of an increase in opportunities for individuals to create and
publish content, and a decrease in the opportunities for commercial actors to
intervene in the selection and dissemination of works would seem to be a
boon for inclusiveness.
Unfortunately, the dramatic increase in the number of content creators
coincides with a dramatic increase in the concentration of ownership of
platforms for disseminating content, and a dynamic of exponential
concentration of internet users’ attention.55 Both the distribution of user
traffic (page views by users) and links follows a power law distribution.56
The probability of having a large number of links is inversely and
exponentially proportional to the number of links. In practical terms, on the
internet, the power law distribution means a very small number of sites end
up with an extremely high number of links and visits, and a very large
number of sites end up with an extremely small number of links and visits.57
The curve describing such distributions is said to have a ‘long tail’.58
The promise of the ‘long tail’ was that it would have something for
everyone—this was the thesis of an influential cyber-utopian book by Chris
Anderson.59 Trends in the distribution of attention on the internet do not,
however, seem to have borne out the initial optimism about the long tail.
Even Anderson seems to have reconsidered the matter somewhat. In an
article co-written with Wolff, published some time after his influential book,
he cites statistics from Compete, showing that the top 10 Web sites
52. I will discuss below some other very material features of such algorithms, but for now let us
stick with this simplified description.
53. Steven Levy, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND SHAPES OUR LIVES 22
(2011).
54. BENKLER, supra note 2 at 63, 74; Elkin-Koren, supra note 2 at 384.
55. See e.g. ELI M. NOAM, WHO OWNS THE WORLD’S MEDIA?: MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND
OWNERSHIP AROUND THE WORLD (2016), 8.
56. This pattern was recognized fairly early, for example in the work of Bernardo A. Huberman et
al., Strong Regularities in World Wide Web Wurfing, 280 SCIENCE 95–97 (1998).
57. Hindman, supra note 51 at 42; BENKLER, supra note 2 at 243.
58. Chris Anderson, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE
(2006).
59. Id. See also BENKLER, supra note 2 at 242.
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accounted for 31% of US page views in 2001, 40% in 2006, and about 75%
in 2010.60 In July 2017, according to one study, five websites—Google,
Facebook, YouTube, Yahoo, and Amazon—owned 32.34% of website
traffic.61
Benkler, drawing on studies by Pennock, Dresner and Farrell, and
others, argued that attention and link distribution did not always follow an
exponential curve. There were, he said, ‘clusters of moderately read sites’
providing ‘platforms for vastly greater numbers of speakers than were heard
in the mass media environment’.62 Particularly salient to civil society—this
was the distribution to be found among political blogs.63
Professor Matthew Hindman’s more recent work contradicts this
conclusion.64 Having conducted his own study of the distribution of attention
online, and reviewed the literature on the subject, Hindman reported in 2008
that the top ten political websites, in relation to any given political issue,
amount for more than half the total links.65 As for news, he found that
audience share among online media sites is not more equal than in print
media. The top twenty online news outlets, he found, had more of the online
market than they did in print media. Particularly telling was the drop in
audience share for media organizations in what he categorized as the ‘middle
class’—outlets ranked 21-500 in terms of their readership:66
“Outlets ranked from 101 to 500 account for 35 percent of print
newspaper readership, but only 22 percent of readership for media
sites. And while papers below the top 500 represent only 9 percent of
the nation’s print circulation, 21 percent of media site visits go to
outlets ranked 500 or below.”67

Overall concentration, he found, was similar on the net and in traditional
media. The difference was that online attention was more fragmented than it
was among traditional media.68
Recent studies of the UK news media markets show similar trends.
While the number of national newspapers did not drop between 2007 and
2018, the number of local and regional newspapers has decreased by 25% in
60. Anderson and Wolff, supra note 8.
61. Alexandra Tachalova, This Is What They Search For: The Most Popular US Industries
&amp; Traffic Shares, MOZ, https://moz.com/blog/most-popular-us-industries-traffic-shares (last
visited Apr 16, 2019).
62. BENKLER, supra note 2 at 242
63. Id at 251.
64. Note also that Benkler’s recent comments in Hylton, supra note 40, suggest that he may also
revise his views on this matter.
65. Hindman, supra note 51 at 49.
66. Id. at 94.
67. Id. at 92-93.
68. Id.
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the same period from 1,303 in 2007 to 982 in 2018.69 The increase in supply
side concentration coincides with a dramatic increase in the proportion of
UK adults for whom the internet is the main source of news from 4% in 2007
to 37% in 2018; and in the percentage of adults who read news on internet
from 20% to 64% in the same period.70 Correlation is not causation and there
are multiple causes for the increase in concentration, but it is tolerably clear
that both the free sharing of news stories online, and power law distributions
of attention online, play a role.71
Fragmentation of attention into the long tail, as much as concentration
in the ‘short head’, seems to exacerbate inclusiveness problems. Professor
Anita Elberse’s book on blockbusters suggests that attention in the long tail
is ever more diffuse, while blockbusters receive an ever more concentrated
proportion of the public’s attention.72 For example, of 8 million digital music
tracks sold in 2011, approximately 94% sold fewer than 100 copies, while
32% sold only one copy. Compare this to 2009, when 6.4 million tracks were
sold, of which 93% sold fewer than 100 copies, and 27% sold only one copy;
and again to 2007, where 3.9 million digital tracks were sold, with 91%
selling fewer than 100 copies, and 24% selling only one copy.73 Google’s
CEO, Eric Schmidt, described the trend in this way:
“I would like to tell you that the internet has created such a level
playing field that the long tail is absolutely the place to be, that there’s
so much differentiation . . . Unfortunately, that is not the case . . . In
fact, it is probable that the internet will lead to larger blockbusters
and more concentration of brands.”74

The short head is getting shorter and fatter and the long tail, longer and
thinner.
It follows logically that the redistribution and fragmentation of attention
into the long tail comes at the expense of ‘middle class’, moderately sized
media producers.75 The problem is not only that winners take all. It is that
both the ‘losers’ (for want of a better word for members of the fragmented
long tail) and ‘winners’ draw attention away from the class of professional
69. OVERVIEW OF RECENT DYNAMICS IN THE UK PRESS MARKET - A REPORT FOR DCMS (2018),
https://secure.toolkitfiles.co.uk/clients/19826/sitedata/Reports/Press-report-for-DCMS.pdf./, 4.
70. Id. at 6.
71. CAIRNCROSS, supra note 7 at 17, 37.
72. ANITA ELBERSE, BLOCKBUSTERS: HIT-MAKING, RISK-TAKING, AND THE BIG BUSINESS OF
ENTERTAINMENT (2013).
73. Id.
74. Eric Schmidt, quoted in James Manyika, Google’s View on the Future of Business: An
Interview with CEO Eric Schmidt, 1 MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 136–38 (2008).
75. Matthew Hindman, What is the Online Public Sphere Good For? THE HYPERLINKED
SOCIETY: QUESTIONING CONNECTIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE, MICHIGAN: DIGITAL CULTURE BOOKS
268–88 (2008).
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and competent, if not extravagantly successful, authors and publishers of
works; and indeed the whole commercial infrastructure in which they are
situated. This shrinking ‘middle class’ would include precisely the kind of
independent denizens of the creative world on whom we might rely to sustain
the diversity and inclusiveness of the public sphere.
1.3 The dynamics of filtration concentrate attention
The concentration of attention on the internet that I have been
describing is closely connected to the dynamics of ‘dis-intermediated’ online
filtration and selection. Three important features of these dynamics require
special attention.
Firstly, the internet does not seem to have displaced the role of
commercial media organizations in selecting and filtering content. As
Netanel predicted in 2001, consumers still need assistance in evaluating the
quality and credibility of information and its providers. They therefore rely
on filtration and accreditation tools similar to those operating in the mass
media.76 Consequently, media sources that were dominant before the internet
also tend to dominate on the internet.77
Secondly, the dynamics of filtration themselves tend to compound
existing concentrations of attention. Recursive filtration algorithms
operating on search engines and social networks quickly generate a hierarchy
of visibility on the internet. Heavily linked sites will appear higher in search
results on search engines, will therefore attract more views and links, and
(assuming a route to monetizing views such as advertising) will gain access
to more resources.78 The reason for this is that search rankings have
considerable influence over the way in which internet users direct their
attention. Search engine users rarely look beyond the first few results yielded
by any given search, let alone the first page of results.79 One review of
literature on click-through rates on search engine results found that, on
average, 29.6% of searchers select the first result displayed, 13.1%, the
second result, 9.2%, the third, with a decreasing percentage down to the tenth
76. Netanel, Cyberspace Self Governance, supra note 3 at 477.
77. Hindman, supra note 51 at 62.
78. Id. at 55, 72, 93.
79. Numerous studies arrive at materially the same conclusion, using different methods. See e.g.
Nadine Höchstötter & Dirk Lewandowski, What Users See–Structures in Search Engine Results Pages,
179 INFORMATION SCIENCES 1796–1812 (2009); Gord Hotchkiss, Marina Garrison & Steve Jensen,
Search Engine Usage in North America, WHITE PAPER, ENQUIRO, KELOWNA, BC, CANADA (2005);
Mark T. Keane, Maeve O’Brien & Barry Smyth, Are People Biased in Their Use of Search Engines?,
51 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 49–52 (2008); THE VALUE OF GOOGLE RESULT POSITIONING, 2015
(2013), https://justmythinking.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ChitikaInsightsValueofGoogleResultsPositioning.pdf (last visited Aug 21, 2017).

THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF NETWORKS

2019

The Disappointments of Networks

12/23/2019 12:03 AM

23

result.80 In sum, sites that win attention will tend to increase the attention
they gain, and sites which attract little attention will be ever less likely to
attract more.
Thirdly, the means of filtration itself is highly concentrated. The trope
of the liberated individual ‘surfing’ the web on her own terms is outdated.
Most internet activity is mediated through key application which aggregate
and distribute works in one way or another: most notably search engines and
social networks.81 The ownership of these internet platforms is highly
concentrated and vertically integrated.82 Likewise, supply in various key
platform media niches (video on demand, audio streaming, news, etc.) is
highly concentrated. Economies of scale, power law distributions of
attention, and above all, network effects promote winner-takes-all outcomes
among internet platforms.83
Whatever its causes, the communicative and cultural power of
dominant internet platforms is evident from figures on viewership, market
share and reach, and advertising investment share on the internet. For the
past ten years, Google’s share of the search engine market has hovered
around 90%.84 As at January 2017, one statistics analysis site had Facebook
at 87% share of the UK social network market.85 According to a different
study, Facebook’s share of global social media market (as of April 2019), is
slightly lower, at 61.55%.86
Market reach figures are no less stunning. In 2016, Facebook was used
by almost 78% of U.S. smartphone users.87 In the same year, 63% of US

80. Michael Hodgdon, Understanding the Value and Importance of Organic First-Page Results,
LINKEDIN (2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/understanding-value-importance-organic-first-pagemichael-hodgdon-/ (last visited Aug 8, 2019).
81. Anderson and Wolff, supra note 8.
82. Hindman, supra note 51 at 93.
83. Barnett, supra note 20 at 2. On the workings of network effects with regard to internet
applications, see LANIER, supra note 19 at 161ff.
84. As of 10 July 2019, StatCounter had Google’s market share currently at 92.62%, while
Statista had it at 88.47% as at April 2019. See Search Engine Market Share Worldwide, STATCOUNTER
GLOBAL STATS, http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share (last visited Jul 10, 2019); Search
engine market share worldwide 2019, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwidemarket-share-of-search-engines/ (last visited Jul 10, 2019).
85. Facebook’s market share in the UK 2014-2017 | Statistic, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/280301/market-share-held-by-facebook-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/
(last visited Mar 18, 2017).
86. Social networks ranked by market share UK 2019, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/280295/market-share-held-by-the-leading-social-networks-in-theunited-kingdom-uk/ (last visited Jul 10, 2019).
87. comScore Releases February 2016 U.S. Desktop Search Engine Rankings, COMSCORE, INC,
http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Rankings/comScore-Releases-February-2016-US-Desktop-SearchEngine-Rankings (last visited Mar 18, 2017).
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smartphone users logged into Facebook an average of 8 times per day.88
According to one study, this year Facebook had a market reach of 81%, and
Google had a market reach of 71%, in the global mobile apps market of
around 3 billion users, with Facebook the most downloaded mobile app in
2019.89 30% of internet users’ time spent online, globally, was spent on
social media.90 And according to Statista, as at May 2019, Facebook had
2.32 billion users worldwide.91
A survey of the market reach of online video platforms from November
2018 found that 90 percent of internet users in the United States accessed
YouTube (owned by Alphabet, which also owns Google) to watch online
video. Facebook was ranked second with a 60 percent market reach.92 In the
United States, 85 percent of online users watched video online on a weekly
basis.93 As at 10 July 2019, one statistics service estimated YouTube’s share
of the online video portal market at 74.75%.94
What about web traffic? A study from 2015 by internet analysis
website, Parse.ly, found that, between them, Facebook and Google
accounted for 81% of traffic to the Parse.ly network of media sites, with 43%
going through Facebook and 38% through Google.95 In January 2017,
Facebook provided nearly 40% of online publishers’ traffic, but it ended the
year at 26% after it changed its news feed algorithm to deprioritize news.96
In the same year, Google started at 34% and ended at 44%.97It is also telling
that Facebook and Google (taken together) accounted for 75% of new
spending on online advertising in 2015. In the US, 85 cents of every dollar
88. Dave Chaffey, Global Social Media Statistics Summary 2017, SMART INSIGHTS (2017),
http://www.smartinsights.com/social-media-marketing/social-media-strategy/new-global-social-mediaresearch/ (last visited Mar 18, 2017).
89. Nick G, 51 Jaw Dropping App Usage Statistics & Trends, 2019 [Infographic], TECH JURY
(2019), https://techjury.net/stats-about/app-usage/ (last visited Jul 10, 2019).
90. Id.
91. Global social media ranking 2019, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/ (last
visited Jul 10, 2019).
92. U.S. user reach of leading video platforms 2018, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266201/us-market-share-of-leading-internet-video-portals/ (last
visited Jul 10, 2019).
93. Id.
94. Datanyze, Online Video Platforms Market Share Report | Competitor Analysis | YouTube,
Vimeo, Wistia, DATANYZE, https://www.datanyze.com/market-share/online-video (last visited Jul 10,
2019).
95. Using Tags at Digital Publishers | Parse.ly Data Studies,
https://www.parsely.com/resources/data-studies/authority-report-8/ (last visited Mar 19, 2017).
96. Rani Molla, Google is Sending More Traffic Than Facebook to Publishers — Again, VOX
(2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/12/11/16748026/google-facebook-publisher-traffic-2017-increase
(last visited Jul 10, 2019).
97. Id.
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spent on digital marketing went to the two companies in the first quarter of
2016.98 The willingness of advertisers to commit the overwhelming majority
of their online budget to these two platforms is a striking indication of the
extent to which Google and Facebook command internet users’ attention.
Facebook and Alphabet’s (Google’s) incredible reach and dominance
of the platform market, coupled with the dynamics of search and filtration
described above, places an enormous wealth of communicative and cultural
power into their hands. Facebook works on a business model where
developers build applications within the Facebook platform, ultimately
controlled by Facebook.99 Google manages both traffic and advertising and
has cemented its monopoly over internet search.100 It uses this dominance to
push other products and services within its portfolio.101 It is hard to imagine
a scenario further from the cyber-utopian vision of decentralized digital
democracy, characterized by self-actualized yeoman-publishers combining
their communicative powers over open networks.
1.4 ‘Free’ distribution of works contributes to concentration problems
in online content economies
We have considered the distribution of communicative power as
between dominant and less dominant websites and online platforms. What
about the distribution of power as between dominant internet platforms,
copyright owners, and users of works? In the networked environment both
copyright owners and users tend to cede communicative power and resources
to dominant internet platforms: especially search engines and social
networks. To be sure, when an internet user gains a right or capacity to access
or use content without the need to pay or ask copyright owners for
permission, the individual generally gains in communicative power.
Likewise, when ordinary individuals find themselves able to publish works
easily and inexpensively, their capacity to participate in culture and
discourse increases. But the very exercise of that capacity by individuals
contributes to other asymmetries of communicative and cultural power.

98. Matthew Garrahan, Advertising: Facebook and Google Build a Duopoly, FINANCIAL TIMES,
https://www.ft.com/content/6c6b74a4-3920-11e6-9a05-82a9b15a8ee7 (last visited Mar 18, 2017).
99. Anderson and Wolff, supra note 8.
100. John Bellamy Foster & Robert W. McChesney, The Internet’s Unholy Marriage to
Capitalism, 62 MONTHLY REVIEW 1, 5 (2011).
101. In the EU, Google is currently facing a potential fine for using its dominance in the search
market to build its Google Shopping service. See Rochelle Toplensky, Google Faces Big Fine in First
EU Case Against Search Practices, FINANCIAL TIMES (2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d365e7305025-11e7-a1f2-db19572361bb (last visited Jun 16, 2017).
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As Lanier points out, the removal of barriers to copying leads to a
proliferation of businesses online that profit from selling services about
information, rather than producing and selling information itself. Third
parties pay to manipulate the online options that appear in front of people
from moment to moment.102 On the internet, ‘If you’re not paying for
something, you’re not the customer; you’re the product being sold’.103
Providing free (frictionless) access to works and engaging user attention
allows internet platforms to profit from the user-as-product in two main
ways.
Firstly, user attention is itself a valuable commodity. Platforms and
websites can sell advertising on the basis of page ‘views’ or ‘eyeballs’.
Works, on the internet, are used as vehicles for attracting user attention.104
Internet intermediaries trade in that attention, and information about it. So,
when an individual takes advantage of her power to access works freely
while using an application on which those works are available, the
intermediary that runs the application parlay this into profit. Any single view
(access to a page or work by a user) is in this sense valuable for its own sake.
Secondly, a user’s engagement with a work, whether by clicking
through to a link to see the work, a ‘share’, a ‘like’, or some other use is
valuable as a ‘signal’. For search engines and social network application
providers, “Every action a user performs is considered a signal to be
analyzed and fed back into the system.”105 By aggregating signals and using
big data analysis tools, internet platforms can make predictions about users,
which can then be used to target further content and advertising. This
capacity to target content helps dominant internet platforms to keep user
attention fixed in the network, which makes advertising space on the internet
platform more valuable and gives it an advantage relative to competitors who
do not have access to the same signals about users. In other words, free
content helps to compound network effects.
By providing free access to works, the internet platform maximizes its
user base, and its capacity to sell advertisements and valuable data.106 Barnett
102. Lanier, supra note 19 at 199. See also Cohen, supra note 21 at 92: “Platform protocols invite
commons-based production arrangements, and commons-based production arrangements in turn
reinforce platform logics of data harvesting and proprietary, algorithmic knowledge production.”
103. Andrew Lewis, cited in PARISER, supra note 22 at 21.
104. See TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR HEADS
(2016). See also Cohen, supra note 31, who describes the commercial exploitation of internet users’
personal data as a new ‘enclosure’ of a ‘biopolitical public domain’.
105. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth Cukier, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013), 113; See also KEEN, supra note 41 at 58.
106. See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 133 UC DAVIS L. REV. (2017). She
writes (at 145), “Economically speaking, platforms represent both horizontal and vertical strategies for
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describes Google’s business model as follows. Google distributes
‘informational assets’—content—to individual users at zero price. These
information assets include search results and links on the search engine, news
aggregations and snippets on Google news, user generated videos on
YouTube, searchable snippets of books on Googlebooks, and so on. In
distributing this content, it obtains data about individuals, which it sells to
advertisers. It maximizes revenues by driving down its input costs (the cost
of analyzing web pages and providing links to them). This in turn maximizes
the Google user base, which enhances the power and value of Google’s data
set and data analysis. Internet platforms like Google have an interest in being
able to copy works in the course of analyzing and ranking them, and in being
permitted to provide links to works, without paying the copyright owners of
those works. This is largely what allows them to run a profitable dataanalysis and ad-selling business.107
Not only is the provision of free access to works lucrative for dominant
internet intermediaries; it also gives them a stunning amount of
communicative and cultural power. That power is, in some ways, power over
users. It is power that allows internet intermediaries and their customers
(such as advertisers) to manipulate and target internet users in ways that the
users are not aware of (although recent media attention is increasing public
awareness).108 It is hard to fully comprehend the extent of the power of data
aggregation, but a few examples help to give a sense of it.
Signal analysis by internet intermediaries produces incredibly detailed
information about individual users. For example, using only Facebook
‘likes’, researchers in one study were able fairly reliably to ‘model’ the latent
traits of 58,000 volunteers, including traits such as sexual orientation,
ethnicity, religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence,
happiness, and substance addiction, among others.109 Another study
indicated that Facebook was able both to predict user emotions based on data
extracting the surplus value of user data. Because that goal requires large numbers of users generating
large amounts of data, the platform provider’s goal is to become and remain the indispensable point of
intermediation for parties in its target markets.”
107. Barnett, supra note 20 at 9. Barnett makes much of this interest, and argues that Google and
other platforms have actively campaigned to reduce the strength, scope and duration of copyright in
pursuit of it. See also COHEN, supra note 106 at 145-146 for an analysis of strategies used for
leveraging the two sided market: free content to users, paid ad space for advertisers.
108. See LANIER, supra note 19. See also SIVA VAIDYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF
EVERYTHING (2011), 1219. On user lack of awareness of the way in which data analysis works, see
Zeynep Tufekci, Algorithmic Harms beyond Facebook and Google: Emergent Challenges of
Computational Agency, 13 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 203 (2015), 209, 215.
109. M. Kosinski, D. Stillwell & T. Graepel, Private Traits and Attributes are Predictable from
Digital records of human behavior, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
5802–5805 (2013).
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analysis, and manipulate emotions through the newsfeed.110 Worse, most
users, even fairly sophisticated ones, have not generally been aware of the
extent to which data is collected about them, and used to tailor information
and advertisements that are presented to them, or to influence their
behavior.111The cumulative gains in internet intermediary power offset, to a
considerable degree, users’ gains in communicative empowerment.
In short, the relationship between freer access to works online and selfauthorship is not straightforward.
1.5 Concentration and blandness (again)
One might take the optimistic view that concentration of attention and
power on online platforms is no cause for concern. One reason to take such
a view is that, in spite of the dominance of players like Google and Facebook,
alternatives exist. Users are free to seek out works elsewhere. Copyright
owners are free not to publish their content for free on those dominant
platforms, and to use other channels for dissemination.
Another reason is that dissemination of works through internet
platforms is not, as Benkler points out, subject to selection and filtration of
works at a single point of control. Network filtration is supposed to disintermediate the curation and selection of works. It is supposed to give effect
to the preferences of individuals, and helpfully order information by
aggregating such preferences. This would seem to be the epitome of
inclusiveness, self-authorship and democracy: where the collective actions
of unconstrained, autonomous individuals, rather than the self-interested
curatorial decisions of commercially minded platforms, determine what
works are visible to any given member of the public.
1.5.1 Network effects
There are good reasons to take a more pessimistic view, however. While
both copyright owners and users are, in form, free to seek or publish works
outside applications, in practice, network effects mitigate against this.
110. Munmun De Choudhury et al., Characterizing and Predicting Postpartum Depression from
Shared Facebook Data, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED
COOPERATIVE WORK & SOCIAL COMPUTING 626–638 (2014),
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2531602.2531675 (last visited Aug 8, 2019). See also Robert Booth,
Facebook Reveals News Feed Experiment to Control Emotions, THE GUARDIAN (June 29, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/29/facebook-users-emotions-news-feeds
111. Tufekci, supra note 108 at 208-12. This may be changing, given recent news about the so
called ‘Mueller investigation’ into Russian ‘election hacking’ and important journalistic efforts, such as
Carole Cadwalladrs series of prize-winning articles about targeted political advertising on Facebook
and the Cambridge Analytica scandal. See e.g. Cadwalladr, supra note 21.
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Knowing that around half Americans get their news through Facebook, and
a quarter of UK adults from Google, a publisher of news content would be
ill advised to eschew the platforms.112 Indeed, Facebook’s recent
reprioritization of news content in user feeds is a serious blow to news
providers who had spent time and money optimizing content for Facebook,
and come to rely on Facebook referrals and advertising eyeballs as a key
source of revenue.113 By the same token, knowing she is likely to access a
great deal of news content for free on Facebook, and having also come to
rely heavily on Facebook to keep in touch with friends, even to the point of
losing their other contact details, a user has little prima facie incentive to go
elsewhere.114
Moreover, the logic of filtration on search engines and social networks
is opaque. It is mostly concealed from the public. Individuals have little
knowledge or control of the criteria by which applications like Facebook or
Google filter, rank and present information to them.115 The example of the
news publishers in the paragraph above has further import. Content
businesses that increasingly rely on these applications to disseminate their
content are also subject to the whims of these organizations. Business models
built on optimizing content for search engines, news feeds and online
advertising may be swept away from one day to the next.
1.5.2 Personalization and ‘the filter bubble’
The most problematic pressure, however, has to do with the ways in
which search engine and social network algorithms are calibrated to produce
‘relevant’ content for their users. The relevance of any given ranking in a
news feed or search results page is not determined only objectively—by
reference to aggregated preferences of the public as a whole. It is also
determined by an approximation of the subjective preference of the user.
Users’ past viewing and search behavior is, as mentioned above, analyzed as
a signal. Applications like search engines and social networking sites
aggregate data about users with similar signal patterns and attempt to predict
preferences based on that analysis.

112. NIC NEWMAN ET AL., Digital News Report 2018 (2018),
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/digital-news-report-2018.pdf. , pp.10-11. On
the mismatch in negotiating power between online platforms such as Google and Facebook, and news
publishers, see CAIRNCROSS, supra note 7 at 57; OVERVIEW OF RECENT DYNAMICS IN THE UK PRESS
MARKET - A REPORT FOR DCMS, supra note 69 at 35, 61.
113. CAIRNCROSS, supra note 7 at 70.
114. On ‘punishing’ network effects of this kind, see LANIER, supra note 19 at 161ff.
115. PARISER, supra note 22 at 10, 106.
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In 2009 Google changed its search algorithm so that it now tailors
search results based on signals and data gathered about the individual
conducting the search. For example, a search for ‘proof of climate change’
might turn up different results for an environmental activist and an oil
company executive.116 The oil executive might see results tending to play
down climate change; the activist, results tending to assert its importance,
and prove its existence. Different individuals, in other words, are presented
with different information purporting to be factual and organically, neutrally
derived from the ‘wisdom of crowds’.
Facebook’s algorithm for ranking content in user news feeds, Edgerank,
also uses personalization.117 There are some differences between the way in
which personalization is tailored on Facebook, Google and other
intermediary platforms. The biggest platforms are, however, broadly similar
in one important way. Results are tailored for ‘relevance’ to individual users,
based on past signals such as views, ‘likes’, searches, buys, and language
used on the platform and related applications.118
It is not clear to me that this kind of personalization is empowering to
individuals. On the contrary, it seems to give internet platforms considerable
power over individuals (a reduction in self-authorship). The author and
businessman Eli Pariser popularized the term ‘filter bubble’ to describe the
characteristic of the internet whereby search engines and social networks
algorithmically tailor content to maximize each individual user’s attention.119
The filter bubble is a space in which individuals are cordoned off from
whatever information is deemed irrelevant to them by the algorithm that is
personalizing their information stream. Pariser writes,
“When you enter a filter bubble, you’re letting the companies that
construct it choose what options you’re aware of. You may think
you’re the captain of your own destiny, but personalization can lead
you down a road to a kind of informational determinism in which
what you’ve clicked in the past determines what you see next.”120

More troubling still is the fact that individuals have, at least until recently,
tended not even to be aware of the extent to which the information presented
to them is personalized.121 This outcome is even less inclusive than the mass
116. Id. at 3.
117. For details on the differences between the ranking algorithms of Google and Facebook, see
Id. at 37ff.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 16.
121. On this general lack of awareness, and the lack of transparency regarding the mechanics of
filtration, see e.g Will Oremus, Who Controls Your Facebook Feed, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/cover_story/2016/01/how_facebook_s_news_feed_algorithm
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media model, and liable to reduce the diversity of the range of works to
which individuals are exposed.
Individuals’ general lack of agency in the filtration process is not the
only troubling feature of the ‘filter bubble’. As I explained in the preceding
part of this chapter, works are powerful tools for engaging the attention of
the public, and data about that attention is packaged and used to sell
advertising.122 Indeed, the key objective of internet applications such as
Google and Facebook is to maximize user time on their apps. The lion’s
share of their other business objectives—collecting, analyzing and selling
valuable data, selling advertising, and so on—are dependent on keeping the
attention of as many users as possible, for as long as possible, on their
application.123 Lanier describes the dominant internet applications as
“empires of behavior modification for rent”.124 Their user interfaces and
content presentation and prioritization strategies are consciously and
carefully designed to cultivate compulsive engagement by users, even
addiction.125
Works and content displayed to users therefore become both vehicles
for advertising, and for harvesting the attention and data used in targeting
that advertising. This has significant repercussions for the parameters under
which works are produced, funded, and displayed (ranked) in users’
networked information streams. The kind of attention that is of interest to
internet platforms and their customers (advertisers and sometimes political
organizations) is not necessarily the kind of attention which promotes users’
self-authorship, or productive participation in democratic deliberation. Nor
does internet platforms’ quest for attention through curation of filter bubbles
seem optimal for cultivating diversity and inclusiveness.
In analyzing data about video views, Facebook counts the ‘view’ at the
three second mark (whether or not the viewer has even turned on the

_works.html (last visited Aug 11, 2017); Frank A. Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The
Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, AVAILABLE AT SSRN 1686043 (2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686043 (last visited Feb 15, 2015).
122. See KEEN, supra note 41 at 117.
123. See Bianca Bosker, The Binge Breaker, THE ATLANTIC, 2016,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/the-binge-breaker/501122/. (last visited May 6,
2017); Tristan Harris, How Technology is Hijacking Your Mind — from a Former Insider, THRIVE
GLOBAL (May 18, 2016), https://journal.thriveglobal.com/how-technology-hijacks-peoples-mindsfrom-a-magician-and-google-s-design-ethicist-56d62ef5edf3#.sgtkj5xjn. (last visited May 9, 2017).
124. Lanier, supra note 9 at 10.
125. For a list of psychologically manipulative strategies used to maintain and direct user attention,
see Harris, supra note 121; Lanier, supra note 9 at 10.
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sound).126 This bespeaks an intention to divert attention momentarily, either
to register a ‘view’ that triggers payment by advertisers, or in fact to display
an ad, rather than presenting something of enduring interest to a user. The
signals that likely interest the profit-minded internet platform are signals
about what will attract a click or a view from a user, not signals about the
quality of the users’ experience once the click has been made. Internet
platforms make money distracting and maintaining user attention long
enough to elicit a datum about consumption preferences, or to present an
advertisement, and then distracting attention again with some new stimulus.
Pariser points out that our responses to content presented in news feeds
and other similar ranked presentations of works and information tend to be
driven by impulse. We are, he points out, naturally predisposed to be
attracted by certain stimuli. We are likely to read content about sex, power,
gossip, violence, celebrity, or humor, first. This is the content that makes it
most easily into the filter bubble.127 Works which most readily featured in
social networking news feeds are those which stimulate outrage.128 The
metric of what we read first, or click on most often, though, provides
suppliers with a fairly skewed picture of our tastes.129 Such content would
seem as suitable a candidate for the Baywatch critique about the proliferation
of lowest common denominator fare, as anything presented by mass media.
1.5.3 Group polarization
Another problem with the filter bubble is that it contributes to
polarization in discourse and culture. Professor Cass Sunstein has explained
that, where members of a group begin with broadly similar views, interaction
within the group tends to galvanize members toward more extreme iterations
of the view they initially took.130 For example, a group of people who are
opposed to the minimum wage are likely, after talking to each other (and not
to others with whom they disagree) to be still more opposed. People who
believe global warming is a serious problem are likely, after to discussion
126. Hank Green, Theft, Lies, and Facebook Video, MEDIUM (2015),
https://medium.com/@hankgreen/theft-lies-and-facebook-video-656b0ffed369. (last visited Nov 12,
2015).
127. PARISER, supra note 22 at 18, 32, 127.
128. Sam Harris, What is Technology Doing to Us?, MAKING SENSE PODCAST (Apr. 14, 2017),
https://samharris.org/podcasts/what-is-technology-doing-to-us/; See also Recode Staff, Full Transcript:
Time Well Spent Founder Tristan Harris on Recode Decode, RECODE (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.recode.net/2017/2/7/14542504/recode-decode-transcript-time-well-spent-founder-tristanharris. (last visited May 6, 2017).
129. Harris, supra note 123.
130. See e.g. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 3-4
(1 edition ed. 2009).
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with like-minded interlocutors, to insist on ever more severe measures to
prevent global warming. People who take the opposite view, if they only talk
to like-minded ‘climate change sceptics’, are likely to become more
stridently opposed to measures taken to mitigate climate change.131 Sunstein
charts out various psychological and sociological reasons for this shift
toward extremes, but those details are beyond the scope of this article.132
Here is an example of group polarization in action, even in that most
promising system for organizing creativity—networked peer production.
Early in the second Iraq war, the Los Angeles Times attempted to
crowdsource an editorial—a ‘wikitorial’ on the conflict. Arguments between
those with opposing viewpoints quickly descended into ‘flamewars’.
Ultimately the publication forked the debate into two separate sides, each
side deliberating only with its own members.133 The result was, in effect, to
polarize the two sides, excluding each from the perspective of the other—a
total failure of inclusiveness and diversity. Polarization happened here
merely because participants were allowed to split into separate deliberating
groups, not because they were intentionally herded in any way.
When deliberation and discussion is purposefully nudged into groups
of like-minded people via relevance filtration, chances of polarization are
very high. Filtration algorithms on social networks such as Facebook tailor
users’ newsfeeds based on their past behavior, and the past behavior of their
‘friends’, and tend to corral them into groups of like-minded people, who
post and share content with which they tend already to agree.134
Indeed, presenting users with increasingly extreme iterations of an
argument or viewpoint that they have initially engaged (by viewing a video,
say) has proven a highly effective strategy for maximizing user time on
platforms. For example, YouTube has an ‘Up Next’ sidebar, and
automatically starts the next video from this algorithmically generated
131. Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
175–95 (2002).
132. For more, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 24 at 71.
133. John Thornhill, Wiki-Journalism May be Part of the Answer to Fake News, FINANCIAL
TIMES, https://www.ft.com/content/bd8337a2-2bfd-11e7-bc4b-5528796fe35c. (last visited May 26,
2017).
134. Facebook’s feed places more emphasis on the signals of the user’s ‘friends’, while Google is
more targeted around the user’s own past signals. See Richard Waters, Google Tries to Muscle in on
Rivals with New Automated ‘Feed’, FINANCIAL TIMES (2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1c0e1a766beb-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa. (last visited Jul 19, 2017); SUNSTEIN, supra note 130 at 24; Katharine
Viner, How Technology Disrupted the Truth, THE GUARDIAN (July 12, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/12/how-technology-disrupted-the-truth. (last visited Jul
15, 2016); But for an opposing view see Michael Conover et al., Political Polarization on Twitter,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL AAAI CONFERENCE ON WEBLOGS AND SOCIAL MEDIA
(The AAAI Press, Cali.), July 17-21, 2011, at 93.
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sidebar as soon as the last one finishes. The ‘Up Next’ algorithm is
responsible for more than 70 percent of user time on app.135 Its purpose is to
capture and keep user attention, and it turns out that taking users down a
‘rabbit hole’ of increasingly extreme and polarized content is a good way to
do this. Without any intentional malice on the part of YouTube, relevance
maximization produces this very troubling outcome, and it would seem that
preventing it requires deliberate, active curation on the part of the platform.
In order for deliberative discourse to avoid the trap of polarization,
deliberators need exposure to, and engagement with, others who do not share
their views. De-centralized filtration and selection of works has not reliably
provided this kind of exposure.
1.6 When ‘grass roots’ goes wrong
So much for algorithmic filtration. What about the differences in author
motivation between copyright-based and online free content systems? A
number of scholars make much of the fact that works produced through
grass-roots engagement, without commercial motivation, tend to differ
significantly (and for the better) from works produced under conventional
commercial publishing arrangements.136 Benkler points out that, in the case
of amateur contributions to culture, decisions about what to publish do not
start from a manager or editor’s judgment about what would be relevant and
interesting to many people without alienating too many others. It starts with
the question, ‘What do I care about most now?’137 Tushnet makes a similar
point, arguing that amateur creation and dissemination of works is driven by
desire and passion, rather than commercial considerations.138 The parameters
and constraints that apply to commercial publication—such as the need to
attract the largest possible paying audience (and therefore to aim for ‘lowest
common denominator’ fare)—are less prominent; while intrinsic
motivations and true political and civic concern have free reign.
With this difference in motivation, will tend to come different kinds of
works. There is a gain in expressive variety that comes from an increase in
the production and dissemination of non-commercially motivated creation
of works (diversity). The inclusion of those impassioned ‘voices’ into culture
135. Kevin Roose, The Making of a YouTube Radical, THE NEW YORK TIMES (2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/08/technology/youtube-radical.html (last visited Jun 11,
2019).
136. Tushnet, supra note 2 at 511. See also Elkin-Koren, supra note 2 at 386. See also NETANEL,
supra note 2 at 40-41, on the advantages of ‘non-market speech’.
137. BENKLER, supra note 2 at 260.
138. Tushnet, supra note 28 at 515.
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and discourse (inclusiveness) is also generally a good thing. But it is not
always a good thing, nor is it good in every way for self-authorship and
democracy.
Let me give, here, a few examples of how online dynamics of desire—
dissemination and publication according to what users care about most—
may work against diversity and inclusiveness. These examples are rather
dramatic, and of course, one might offer a number of examples of beneficial
outcomes of desire-based amateur publication and dissemination online. For
example, the ease of podcasting has led to an explosion of creativity and high
quality audio content. Twitter has permitted new forms of political
mobilization and information sharing, allowing coordinated challenges
against powerful state actors. Blogs have helped to supplement the watchdog
role of the media, making important scandals known to the public. Fan
fiction has allowed ordinary individuals to challenge conventions of gender,
sexuality and power by re-imagining works of pop culture.
If we are arguing by example and anecdote, though, (and this seems
very common in arguments celebrating networked information economies)
we ought to make sure we are as cognizant of the gloomy and discouraging
examples as of the inspiring ones.
Ease of publication online is liable to amplify the voices of those who
are most passionate, and most prolific in their output; but not necessarily the
most truthful, or the most rigorous. In a 2016 article in The Atlantic about
racist extremism on the internet, one interviewee pointed out,
Racist propagandists have motivation to put that stuff [white
supremacist propaganda] out . . . The anti-Semites can flood an area
and there’s no contradictory evidence. There aren’t people out there
trying to prove that Jews aren’t running the government.”139

Online forums tend to amplify the voice of the vociferous extremist (or
propagandist) and conceal the opinion of the quiet moderate. This is
obviously bad for diversity and inclusiveness.
The extent to which a person is motivated to create or disseminate or
view a work absent commercial incentives (Benkler’s ‘what do I care most
about now?’ factor) is not itself a measure of the work’s social or cultural
value. One may be simultaneously passionate and ignorant, passionate and
bigoted, passionate and manipulative. Or one might simply be motivated by
mischievous or anarchic impulses—as, it seems, is the now infamous class

139. Olga Khazan, The Tech White Power Used to Go Viral, THE ATLANTIC, 2016,
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/11/how-white-power-went-viral/507473/ (last
visited Nov 15, 2016).
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of amateur content creators, known as internet ‘trolls’.140 As the ‘Russian
election hacking’ and ‘fake news’ scandals have revealed, trolls may be very
organized, able to intentionally and successfully stoke division and spread
misinformation and propaganda, with all of the power of data analytics and
network effects at their disposal.141 Falsehood, conspiracy, misinformation
and disinformation spread very quickly online, especially if their
dissemination is carefully targeted.142
In one sense, the explosion of radical voices online is democratizing,
because it suggests that marginal voices are finding a new platform.143 But
ultimately, if the aim is to foster productive democratic deliberation and
individual self-authorship prioritizing marginal, extreme, and downright
false content at the expense of more balanced, reasoned, tolerant, or simply
more representative content, is unhelpful. In so far as individual users are led
down partisan ‘rabbit holes’, the diversity of the content they experience is
stifled. In so far as they are encouraged into passivity, and subject to
powerful infrastructures designed to influence and modify their behavior, the
consequent distribution of cultural and communicative power would seem to
be far from inclusive.
1.7 Propaganda and manipulation
The concentration of attention on Google and Facebook, combined with
the insights available from extensive analysis of users’ data, makes those
platforms and their users particularly vulnerable to dissemination of
falsehood.144 Governments or political groups seeking to suppress or
influence information flows find themselves in a game of ‘one stop
shopping’: by targeting users through a handful of dominant internet
platforms they can exert great reach and influence.145
A series of important investigative articles documents the role played
by social media propaganda campaigns, targeting users through big data
140. On the negative effects of trolling on diversity and inclusiveness—and especially on the
participation of women in online fora—see Erin E. Buckels, Paul D. Trapnell & Delroy L. Paulhus,
Trolls Just Want to Have Fun, 67 PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 97, 97 (2014); see
generally Amanda Hess, Why Women Aren’t Welcome on the Internet, PACIFIC STANDARD (2014),
https://psmag.com/why-women-aren-t-welcome-on-the-internet-aa21fdbc8d6 (last visited Mar 18,
2017); Manjoo, supra note 11.
141. See generally DiResta et al, supra note 7.
142. Sunstein, supra note 130 at 120.
143. See Benkler in Hylton, supra note 40.
144. However, regarding Facebook’s recent efforts to tackle fake news, see e.g. Madhumita
Murgia & Mehreen Khan, Facebook, Amazon and Google in Europe’s Crosshairs, FINANCIAL TIMES
(2019), https://www.ft.com/content/bf9d355e-2a27-11e9-a5ab-ff8ef2b976c7 (last visited Feb 8, 2019).
145. PARISER, supra note 22 at 44.
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analysis and the use of bots to artificially elevate content in news feeds, in
both the recent US presidential election and the UK ‘Brexit’ referendum.146
Renee DiResta has carefully documented the way in which Russian
government operatives carefully spread disinformation and stoked division
in US politics by targeting Facebook and Twitter campaigns.147 And Carole
Cadwalladr has produced superb investigative articles on the role of an
organization called Cambridge Analytica in both the ‘leave’ campaign, and
Donald Trump’s campaign for presidency. Cambridge Analytica analyzed
data from social media profiles and helped to target campaign messages
based on the results of its analysis.148
Recall, Facebook could manipulate its users’ emotions through the
news feed. It is therefore hardly surprising that Amy Wigmore, Leave.EU’s
communications director, said that Facebook likes were the campaign’s most
‘potent weapon’,
“Because using artificial intelligence, as we did, tells you all sorts of
things about that individual and how to convince them with what sort
of advert. And you knew there would also be other people in their
network who liked what they liked, so you could spread. And then
you follow them. The computer never stops learning and it never
stops monitoring.”149

The particular political entities involved here are less relevant than the means
of spreading their influence. Wigmore is describing the subjugation of
individual self-authorship, the invisible manipulation of individuals’
information sphere, by powerful political actors who know much more about
the individuals than the individuals know about them. It is hard to imagine a
scenario in which communicative power was more asymmetrically
distributed.
1.8 Direct intervention by platforms
What about the claim that networked filtration is more democratic the
basis that it does not have a single point of curatorial control? Things are not
quite so simple. As the examples above suggest, the prospect of direct
interference, at a single point of control, with users’ information streams is
146. Carole Cadwalladr, Robert Mercer: the big data billionaire waging war on mainstream
media, THE GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/26/robert-mercer-breitbart-waron-media-steve-bannon-donald-trump-nigel-farage?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other. (last visited Feb 26,
2017); Cadwalladr, supra note 21.
147. DiResta et al., supra note 7; Renee DiResta, Free Speech in the Age of Algorithmic
Megaphones, WIRED, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-domestic-disinformationalgorithmic-megaphones/ (last visited Nov 14, 2018).
148. Cadwalladr, supra note 21.
149. Id.
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no longer as unlikely as it may once have seemed. Conventional wisdom
depicts filtration algorithms as passive vehicles, simply giving effect to
users’ fully autonomous choices and preferences. As a matter of fact,
however, the operations of algorithmic filtration are fairly opaque.150 This
makes sense, since a successful ranking algorithm is a valuable trade secret.
The perception, however, that filtration on social networks or search engines
is truly ‘organic’ can be misleading and extremely disempowering to users.
This is not only because information ranking algorithms are susceptible
to manipulation, but also because platforms may exercise direct curatorial
control of information flows. A scandal involving Facebook’s ‘trending’
news stories application illustrates the point well. Facebook’s trending news
section was supposed merely to reflect organically whatever news stories
users were sharing. In May 2016, however, it came to light that members of
Facebook’s news team were manipulating and partly curating the ‘trending
news’ module.151 Facebook’s curation involved injecting stories of its own
news team’s choosing, rather than stories that were organically trending. It
also involved suppressing, or demoting, stories which were deemed to have
too strong a conservative bias.152 In some cases, allegedly, after a topic was
injected ‘artificially’ into the news feed by Facebook staff, it picked up
‘organically’ and became the number one trending news topic on
Facebook.153
Platforms may also intervene for less nefarious reasons. Various states
are taking legislative measures to hold platforms accountable for harmful
content posted by users.154Google, Facebook and Twitter have claimed they
will do more to prevent the spread of disinformation, misinformation and
other forms of harmful content online.155 In order to reduce polarization and
outrage, Facebook has also recently announced that it has adjusted its
150. But see CAIRNCROSS, supra note 7, chapter 4, for a helpful review of what is known about the
mechanisms of the main internet search engines and feed ranking systems.
151. See e.g. Ben Hoyle, Facebook in storm over political bias, THE TIMES (May 10, 2016),
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/facebook-in-storm-over-political-bias-vkzrsr9ss.
152. Michael Nunez, Facebook Admits Its Trending Section Includes Topics Not Actually
Trending on Facebook [Update: Zuck Speaks], GIZMODO, http://gizmodo.com/facebook-admits-itstrending-section-includes-topics-no-1776319308 (last visited Sep 18, 2017); Michael Nunez, Former
Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed Conservative News, GIZMODO,
http://gizmodo.com/former-facebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006 (last visited
May 10, 2016).
153. Id.
154. See e.g. DEPARTMENT FOR CULTURE, supra note 7. For a helpful summary of related
measures internationally, see Matthew Lesh, The Moral Panic Behind Internet Regulation, QUILLETTE
(April 30, 2019), https://quillette.com/2019/04/30/the-moral-panic-behind-internet-regulation/.
155. See e.g. DISINFORMATION AND ‘FAKE NEWS’: FINAL REPORT (2019),
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/digital-culture-mediaand-sport-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/fake-news-17-19/ (last visited Feb 19, 2019).

THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF NETWORKS

2019

The Disappointments of Networks

12/23/2019 12:03 AM

39

newsfeed algorithm in order to de-prioritize news items in user feeds.156
Notably, though, Facebook has been fairly obstructive when it comes to
audits of their advertising practices, and efforts to try to understand how
targeted advertising and propaganda campaigns worked.157
Taken at face value, these appear to be promising developments, but
their structural effects are not straightforward. Newspapers aligned their
business models around optimizing for Facebook’s algorithm (in so far as
they could make educated guesses about what would be prioritized). The
more prominent their content on online platforms, the more likely are readers
to click through to their websites, and the more advertising revenue the
papers are likely to derive.158 Having adopted a ‘free’ dissemination model,
and having come to rely on platforms such as Facebook as key points of
dissemination, newspapers are left high and dry when their news content is
suddenly down-shifted in news feeds. The unilateral change, with little
warning, and no consultation, has adversely affected their revenues.159 This
is a dramatic example of the market power of dominant online platforms in
the news market.
More broadly, the kinds of curation I have just described seem very
similar to the kind of centralized selection and control supposed to pervade
traditional copyright-based media. A select group of professionals,
occupying a more or less unassailable point of control, exercise great power
over the contents of culture and discourse. The difference is, traditional news
media do not pretend merely to be presenting an organic report generated by
users’ search and viewing behavior; and few, if any, traditional news media
outlets consistently reach billions of viewers or readers.
We seem faced with a choice between pure ‘dis-intermediated’
algorithmic filtering, with all of the troubling incentive structures that come
with it; or more direct intervention and curation by platforms and ultimately
the state. Both would seem to fall short of Benkler’s hope of removing ‘some
156. Adam Mosseri, News Feed FYI: Bringing People Closer Together, FACEBOOK BUSINESS,
https://en-gb.facebook.com/business/news/news-feed-fyi-bringing-people-closer-together (last visited
Aug 8, 2019).
157. See e.g. DISINFORMATION AND ‘FAKE NEWS’: FINAL REPORT, supra note 155 at 85 (“On the
one hand, Facebook gives the impression of working towards transparency, with regard to the auditing
of its news content; but on the other, there is considerable obfuscation concerning the auditing of its
adverts, which provide Facebook with its ever-increasing revenue. To make informed judgments about
the adverts presented to them on Facebook, users need to see the source and purpose behind the
content.”).
158. CAIRNCROSS, supra note 7 at 8-9.
159. NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 112 at 10-11. On the mismatch in negotiating power between
online platforms such as Google and Facebook, and news publishers, see CAIRNCROSS, supra note 7 at
57; OVERVIEW OF RECENT DYNAMICS IN THE UK PRESS MARKET - A REPORT FOR DCMS, supra note 69
at 61.
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of the most basic opportunities for manipulation of those who depend on
information and communication by the owners of the basic means of
communications and the produces of the core cultural forms.’160
1.9 A more judicious view of ‘free culture’
Digital utopians imagined the online free content sphere, unencumbered
by restrictions on copying and communicating works, as a highly inclusive
digital democracy, characterized by a level communicative playing field, and
populated by individuals whose consumption of works, and contributions to
culture are autonomous and self-actualizing. Benkler advocated the
cultivation of a cultural production and exchange system that is ‘as
unconstraining and free from manipulation as possible’ and saw great
promise in the ‘wealth of networks’.161 The networked information economy
and online marketplace of ideas are not currently living up to that promise.
The Centre For Humane Technology puts it this way:
“[S]eemingly separate problems – tech addiction, teen depression,
shortening attention spans, political polarization, the breakdown of
truth, outrage-ification of culture, and the rise of vanity/microcelebrity culture – are actually not separate issues. They are all
symptoms of one underlying problem: the race between tech giants
to capture human attention, which becomes a race to overwhelm
human weaknesses. Put together, that race creates ‘human
downgrading.’”162

Human downgrading would seem to be the opposite of the democratizing
and self-authorship-enhancing internet that copyright minimalists hoped for.

160.
161.
162.

Supra, note 2 and accompanying text.
BENKLER, supra note 2 at 299.
Centre for Humane Technology, Newsletter, May 2019.
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2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
2.1 Both strengthening and weakening copyright may have troubling
structural consequences
The implications of my analysis for the development of copyright law
are many.
• Changes in copyright law and practice effect the political
economy of creative activity, which affects the quality and
character of works, culture and discourse.
• The political economy, both of traditional copyright media, and
of online free content environments, seems to generate
problematic incentives.
• Communicative and cultural power is not widely enough
distributed: both large internet platforms, and copyright
industry businesses have accrued too much of it.
• Free (or freer) access to content does not necessarily enhance
individuals’ substantive, positive freedom and self-authorship.
• The ‘democratization’ of content functions does not necessarily
produce a more democratic landscape for information and
creativity.
I will focus here, though, on one key imperative that emerges from my
analysis.
Any efforts to develop copyright law must take into account existing
structures of incentive, communicative power and opportunity, and the likely
effects of the proposed intervention on those structures. The structural effects
may not always follow the formal allocations of rights effectuated by the
law. There may be unintended consequences, in terms of the allocation of
wealth, power, influence and opportunity.
To illustrate my point, I will first consider the structural impacts of
expanding fair use. I will look at a number of different recommendations for
the expansion of that exception, as well as an expansion of the
‘transformative use’ doctrine which has in fact occurred.
I do not wish, however, to create the impression that copyrightmaximizing doctrines are safe from the risk of producing structurally
troubling outcomes. The structural impacts of developments in the law may
be significant whether such developments or reforms are calculated to
expand the strength and scope of copyright exceptions and increase users’
rights and privileges with respect to works; or whether they are directed at
shoring up and strengthening exclusive rights in copyright.
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This is a point that needs special emphasis, since the bulk of this article
has been focused on refuting the copyright minimalist / internet optimist
binary so common in the cultural turn. The purpose of this refutation, I want
to reaffirm, is not to make an apology for maximalist copyright. Rather, it is
to balance the scales by showing some of the downsides of online free
content economies; and by showing that the structural and institutional
parameters in which creative activity take place exert meaningful, qualitative
effects, regardless of whether they are instituted by law, day to day practice,
or existing patterns of wealth and power.
After my analysis of fair use, I will therefore briefly consider the
troubling structural implications of an intervention aimed at strengthening
the rights of copyright owners. Article 17 of the European Union’s Directive
on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (hereafter the ‘copyright
directive’) strengthens the formal rights of copyright owners with respect to
online platforms. Its practical effect, however, may be to give dominant
online platforms even more curatorial power over individuals’ informational
and cultural experience.
2.2 Fair use
Let us begin with expansions to the fair use exception to copyright. I
will first review some of the proposed changes to fair use that emerged at the
height of the cultural turn (in the first ten years of this century). Then I will
consider the impacts of an actual change to the doctrine in recent years.
Finally I will apply my insights about these actual changes to the proposals
for further change.
One of the recommendations common to many proponents of the
cultural turn is to expand fairness exceptions: in the case of fair dealing
jurisdictions, by introducing fair use; and in fair use jurisdictions, by
expanding the classes of use deemed fair. Expansion of fair use is generally
justified on the basis that it would enhance freedom of expression, freedom
of imagination, and a fair distribution of cultural power. Unsurprisingly,
recommendations for expanding fairness exceptions were at their height at
the same time as the cultural turn was at its strongest: in the first ten years of
this century.
Recommendations to expand copyright exceptions seem to follow from
the copyright minimalist / internet optimist framing that expects
improvements in diversity and inclusiveness to follow from freer access to
works online. Broadly, such an approach would prioritize individual and
collective interests in a more robust public domain over copyright owners’
interests (and perhaps also over democratic civil society interests of the kind
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articulated by Netanel).163 For example, the sense that inflexible copyright
constrains expressive freedom played a part in the Australian Law Reform
Commission’s recommendation (approved by a more recent Productivity
Commission report) to introduce a broad US style fair use in Australia, to
replace a set of narrow fair dealing exceptions.164
More radical proponents of the cultural turn recommended even more
significant expansions. One recommendation is to invert of the onus of proof
in relation to the fairness of uses of copyright material. Arewa argued that
authors should have to prove uses to be unfair in order to demonstrate
copyright infringement, instead of defendants being required to prove that
the use falls under a fairness exception.165 Bohannan and Hovencamp argued
that the copyright owner should need to prove harm to her ex ante incentive
in order for a use of a work to be held to infringe copyright.166 Netanel
offered a slightly less radical proposal. He contended that once a copyright
defendant shows a ‘colorable claim of fair use’, the burden of proving that
the use is unfair should pass to the copyright owner.167 Each variant of this
approach would (to differing degrees) discourage copyright owners from
suing for licensing fees in relation to markets which they either did not
contemplate when creating their works or have not exploited themselves.
Another similar approach, favored by scholars like Lange, and also
Rubenfeld, adopted a different baseline: freedom of imagination. Lange and
Rubenfeld, in separate articles, argued for the recognition of a positive user
right of freedom of imagination.168 Creative appropriation, Lange argued,
should be presumptively privileged in every instance: rising to the level of
an affirmative user right. A fair use defense to copyright infringement would
be withheld only in cases where there was no creative exercise of
imagination in the second work at all.169
Lange, optimistic about the democratizing power of the internet, had no
hang-ups in moving the whole apparatus of identifying or weighing
commercial harm to the margins of his analysis. Copyright cases concerned
with the use of existing works ought to turn primarily on questions of

163. See Lange, supra note 2 at 469.
164. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Copyright and the Digital Economy: ALRC Report
122 (2013), 87ff; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS - PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INQUIRY
REPORT, supra note 35 at 123.
165. See Arewa, supra note 26 at 553-54.
166. Christina Bohannan & Herbert J. Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 905, 979-82 (2010).
167. Netanel, supra note 2 at 192ff.
168. Rubenfeld, supra note 2 at 4-5; Lange, supra note 2 at 476.
169. Lange, supra note 2 at 479-80.

THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF NETWORKS

44

12/23/2019 12:03 AM

CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.

Vol 19:1

imaginative freedom. They should not, he argued, give primary concern to
the negative effects on the economic value of an antecedent work, although
in some cases, he concedes, ‘equitable provision for sharing the proceeds of
such exploitations would follow’.170
Proponents of these recommendations justify them on the basis that
they would enhance freedom of expression, freedom of imagination, and a
fair distribution of cultural power. Expanding fairness exceptions could
serve to mitigate the causes of the concentration critique, by furnishing
individuals and non-incumbents with greater cultural and communicative
power relative to incumbent copyright industry players. These are, broadly
speaking, inclusiveness goals, with follow on effects for diversity.
2.2.1 Actual expansions to the fair use exception
So much for proposed expansions of the fair use doctrine. What of
actual ones? In the US, the home of fair use, the exception has indeed
expanded in recent years. A series of cases, notably cases concerning the
Google Books and Google Images services, have expanded the concept of
‘transformative use’ to encompass uses of works that do not produce new
works, but rather new ways of distributing and accessing them. Professor
Samuelson describes this new kind of transformative uses as ‘orthogonal’,
and Professor Ginsburg as ‘redistribution’ fair use.171 I will adopt
Samuelson’s ‘orthogonal use’ label.
The effectiveness of fair use exceptions in furthering goals such as
diversity and inclusiveness is not necessarily straightforward. In expanding
the transformative use doctrine, courts gave little attention to the structural
landscape, and as a consequence have helped large online platforms such as
Google to cement their dominance of the information environment. Let me
briefly gloss the significance of ‘transformative’ use in the fair use calculus,
before I explain the import of the expansion of the doctrine.
There are four ‘fair use’ factors considered in determining whether a
use falls under the fair use exception:
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
170. Id. at 479.
171. Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2008), 2544; Jane C.
Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383, 1389-91 (2014).
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(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.172
If the use of an existing work has ‘a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message’, and it does not
‘merely supersede the objects’ of the original, then it is likely to be
considered transformative.173The transformativeness of a use bears on both
the first and fourth factor.
Expanding the scope of what may be considered transformative
therefore expands the scope of the fair use exception. What does the
expansion entail? I will focus here on two cases: each concerning one of
Google’s search services.
In Perfect10 Inc. v Amazon.com Inc., the US 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the display on Google Images of thumbnail images, linking
to pages on which those images were displayed, was a transformative use of
the copyright works embodied in the images.174 The court held the use was
transformative because the purpose of the original photos was ‘aesthetic’,
whereas the search engine used the image as a pointer directing a user to a
source of information.175 This was a departure from earlier authority which
held that difference in purpose is not the same as transformation.176 The fact
that, in making the use, the Google’s image search engine reproduced the
whole image did not prevent the use from being considered
transformative.177
Nor did the commercial profitability of the use lead the court to give
particular weight to the fourth fair use factor: the market harm factor.
Google’s use of the images directed users to websites which had purchased
advertising space through Google’s AdSense offering. The websites
displayed infringing images. Google’s AdSense program was, at the time of
the first instance decision in Perfect 10, worth $630 million: 46% of
Google’s total revenues.178 Strangely, the court described Google’s use of
the images as having only a ‘minor commercial aspect’.179 It went on to
conclude that the mere commerciality of Google’s use could not be presumed
to amount to market harm to the copyright owner, because market harm
cannot be presumed in cases of transformative use. Insufficient evidence on
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

17 USC §107.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
508 F.3d 1146, 1176 (9th Cir 2007).
Id. at 1165.
Infinity Broadcast Corp., 150 F.3d at 104.
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165.
Id. at 1166.
Id. at 1167.
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the question of whether users actually downloaded images from Google for
which they would otherwise have had to pay led the court to hold that
potential harm to Perfect 10’s market ‘remains hypothetical’; and the market
harm factor therefore did not favor a finding of fair use.180
In the Googlebooks case, Google’s unauthorized mass reproduction and
digitization of library books for the purposes of creating a searchable
database, which produced text ‘snippets’ in response to user searches, was
also held to be a fair use.181 The court held the use of the works for a new
purpose—enabling text search—was transformative in the sense intended by
the court in Campbell.182 In other words, the court drew an equivalence
between transformation of purpose and transformation in aesthetics,
meaning or message. The transformativeness was more or less dispositive of
the fair use question, even though Google arguably had commercial motives.
The court noted that even if the purpose of copying is for a valuably
transformative purpose, the product of the transformation might still be a
market substitute for the copyright work. However, it emphasized the
principle from Campbell that the more transformative the use, the less likely
it is that the copies generated by way of the use will serve as a substitute for
the copyright work, and the less likely will be a finding of market harm.183
The Googlebooks court concluded that Google’s use could not rightly be
considered to produce true market substitutes for copyright works, even if
some sales would be lost as a result of snippets being available.184
These cases are significant in a number of ways. They establish a
precedent for treating mass unauthorized copying to facilitate the searching
and browsing of works as transformative uses, even when the copying does
not result in the creation of a new work of authorship, or new meanings,
insights or aesthetics.185 Secondly, they established that courts’ findings on
the first fair use factor (the nature of the use) bear heavily on the analysis of
the fourth fair use factor. The fourth fair use factor is ‘the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’186 They
institute a loose rule of thumb that if a use is transformative, it probably does
not supersede the objects of the original work, and therefore is very unlikely

180. Id. at 1168.
181. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Authors
Guild v. Google, Inc., 136 U.S. 1658 (2016), [hereinafter, ‘Googlebooks’].
182. Googlebooks, 804 F.3d at 216.
183. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591; Googlebooks, 804 F.3d at 214.
184. Googlebooks, 804 F.3d at 223.
185. Id.
186. 17 USC, §107 (2012).
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to operate as a market substitute for that work.187 The more specific
implication of the cases is that where works are reproduced, even in full, for
the purposes of data analysis and search technologies, courts will not assume
an effect on the potential market for or value of the copyright works unless
copyright owners lead specific evidence of actual market harm.
The result is to establish an approach to the fourth fair use factor—the
effect of a use on a copyright work’s potential market or value—in which
the key issue is substitution on markets existing before the development of
an attention-based economy online. Copyright owners are, in effect, deemed
not to be entitled to profit from a search engine’s rendering their works more
searchable, even when internet intermediaries profit directly or indirectly
from the attention that they capture by making the works available in this
way.
On the one hand, these developments are good for inclusiveness and
diversity, at least along some dimensions. The public’s power and
entitlements in relation to the use of works is increased, and this is autonomy
enhancing. Individuals’ and deliberating bodies’ capacity to find the precise
parts of cultural artefacts relevant to their day to day concerns has grown.
The range and diversity of books and images available for the public to
search and browse has also grown.
On the other hand, we should be careful not to lose sight of the broad,
structural picture. If we confine our picture of copyright’s potential benefits
to its supposed incentive effects, then there is little sense in extending
copyright owners’ rights into markets which cannot reasonably be
considered to have affected authors’ and publishers’ motivations in the first
place, especially if the use in question provides a benefit to the public.
Markets for searchable snippets of books, which did not exist at the time of
creation or publishing, seem to fit this description.
But my approach does not confine copyright’s benefits to its incentive
effects. I am interested in substantive, structural effects. A simple example
illustrates the point. Libraries have to buy books in order to lend them to the
public. Google, by contrast, is now not required to pay for their copying of
books in order to render them searchable to the public.188 The result is that
Google is at a structural advantage to libraries (and everybody else), when it
comes to copying works.
More broadly, the substantive, structural effect of the expansion of fair
use in the orthogonal use cases is to allocate communicative power to
187. See Ginsburg, supra note 171.
188. Ginsburg, supra note 171 at 1411.
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dominant internet intermediaries. Those best placed to take advantage of the
developments in fair use brought about by cases like Googlebooks are,
unsurprisingly, dominant internet intermediaries like Google. Concentrating
user attention on free content is extremely profitable for businesses like
Google; not least because it permits the gathering of valuable data about
those individuals that can then be used to sell advertising.189 It is businesses
like Google, on that scale, which have the resources to conduct mass copying
and data analysis exercises, extracting valuable data about the public in the
process. It is businesses of that size that can be confident of having the
resources to defend copyright suits and make a case for fair use. Smaller
businesses are not on the same footing. We should not forget that the
practical outcomes of Googlebooks was to furnish Google with a kind of
monopoly; a first mover advantage against any potential competitors in the
niche of online book search whose scruples or lack of resources prevented
them from digitizing books without permission.
Indeed, in earlier proceedings, the risk of Google’s obtaining a de facto
monopoly over the digital market for millions of books was one of the
grounds for rejecting a proposed settlement between Google and the
plaintiffs.190 Under the settlement, Google would have paid license fees to
copyright owners. If market power was a problem under a settlement where
Google would have been paying license fees for its use, it is surely an even
greater concern in the fair use, zero price scenario.
My concerns about the networked information economy suggest we
take care not to make cultural dominance too easy a feat for internet
intermediaries.We should therefore resist treating orthogonal / redistribution
uses of the kind in the Googlebooks and Google Images cases as
transformative. In the US, this would mean returning to the position on
transformative use set out in Infinity v Kirkwood. That is: copying works in
such a way as to allow them to be used for a different purpose (such as
research, or search), is not the same as transformation.191
Professor Ginsburg, who sounded the alarm over the expansion of
transformative use, has noted some indications of a movement in the

189. See BARNETT, supra note 20 at 10. He writes: “The end-result of these actions is a substantial
depropertization of content assets in online environments, which has benefited search intermediaries by
reducing input costs, reducing intermediaries’ and users’ liability exposure, and, for both reasons,
increasing the size of the intermediaries’ content portfolio, which in turn expands the user population
(and associated data assets) available to be sold to advertisers.”
190. Googlebooks, 804 F.3d at 682–83.
191. Infinity Broadcast Corp., 150 F.3d at 108.
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direction of Kirkwood, at least by the 2nd and 4th Circuit courts.192 Recent
cases such as TCA Corp. v. McCollum and Brammer v Violent Hues show
courts more willing to challenge and reject claims of orthogonal use
transformativeness, especially when the purpose is clearly commercial.193
This is a promising development, and courts should continue to subject
claims of orthogonal transformativeness to heightened scrutiny.
We should also not allow transformative use to predominate too much
in determining questions of fair use. A finding of transformation should not
unduly prejudice findings regarding the fourth fair use factor: the effect on
the potential market for or value of the original work.
Courts should also adopt a broader interpretation of that factor. A use
can be transformative, but at the same time, treating it as fair might allocate
power, wealth and resources away from copyright owners, or
disproportionately toward internet intermediaries in comparison with
copyright owners, and indeed the general public.
The fourth fair use factor requires courts to assess the effect of the use
not only on the ‘potential market for’ the copyrighted work, but also the
‘value of’ that work. Ginsburg points out that ‘value of’ has a distinct
meaning from ‘potential market for’ and warns against interpreting the two
tautologically.194 She explains that works may also serve as a ‘draw’ through
which businesses might derive other forms of value.195
There is at least one case, she observes, which adopts this approach to
the fourth fair use factor: Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t,
Inc.196 There, the third circuit observed that, for the purposes of the fourth
fair use factor, the ‘value of’ a film trailer need not only be understood in
terms of direct income from the trailer. It could also encompass the value
derived from advertising, cross-marketing and cross-selling other products,
and obtaining valuable marketing information from visitors who view the
trailer on webpages to which it was legitimately licensed.
This is a promising authority. Following this line of reasoning, I would
argue that uncompensated use of copyright works for the purposes of
creating searchable indices that themselves serve as a ‘draw’ for attention
192. See Jane Ginsburg, Fair Use in the United States: Transformed, Deformed, Reformed,
(November 11, 2019); Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-639 at 18-20.
193. TCA Corp. v. McCollum, 839 F.3d 168, 179 (2d Cir. 2016); Brammer v Violent Hues, Prods.,
922 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2019), reversing Brammer v. Violent Hues Prods., LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98003 (E.D. Va., June 11, 2018).
194. See Ginsburg, supra note 192 at 37.
195. Id.
196. 342 F.3d 191 at 202 (3rd Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by TD Bank N.A. v. Hill,
928 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2019).
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harvesting deprives copyright owners of value that they might hope to derive
from such activities themselves. Uses of the kind deemed to be fair in the
orthogonal use cases may increase the amount of time users spend on internet
intermediaries’ platforms or applications, or provide valuable data about user
preferences, or facilitate the sale of advertisements. Surely this is an ‘effect
on the value’ of the work: an exploitation of the works capacity to serve as a
‘draw’ of the kind Ginsburg describes. Such uses should therefore not
continue to be treated as fair in future.
In the case of such uses, value is allocated toward internet
intermediaries (and arguably away from copyright owners). The European
Commission described that flow of wealth and power as a ‘value gap’,
whereby copyright owners do not obtain a ‘fair share’ of the value that other
businesses, like internet intermediaries, derive from the use of their works
online.197 For my purposes, the broader question is not whether the
distribution of value is fair in a deontological sense, but rather whether it
fosters an inclusive distribution of communicative power and opportunity in
the information environment. Still, the metaphor of a ‘value gap’ captures
the inclusiveness problems associated with orthogonal uses rather well.
Given the immense commercial value of attention harvesting and data
aggregation, the implication of the orthogonal use cases - that the copyright
owners do not have a legitimate interest in the revenue derived from such
activities, or that they would not expect to profit from their works in such a
way - now seems premature. Having that value captured by dominant
platforms, without having a say, seems a clear and negative effect on the
value of copyright owners’ works.
If we get beyond the incentive narrative, and think in broader, structural
terms, there is more to consider than merely whether a copyright owner was
motivated by the prospect of exploiting her work in a particular market. If
we adopt the values of the cultural turn, we care less about optimizing
incentives, and more about optimizing for inclusiveness and diversity.
This calls for a broader, more purposive, interpretation of the fourth fair
use factor. That factor should not be addressed by reference to a narrow
question, ‘is the copyright owner’s market harmed’? Instead, courts should
ask the broader question, ‘is the effect on the potential market for, or value
of, the work fair.’ A broad consideration of fairness would take into account
197. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single
Market—COM (2016) 593. But see regarding the value gap, see Jessica Litman, Imaginary Bottles, 18
DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 127–136 (2019). She points out (at 129) how much copyright
industries are to blame for their weak bargaining power vis a vis large platforms, due to their own
lengthy delay in supplying works in convenient formats and attractive prices online.
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existing constellations of power and privilege, and the likely effect of
applying the exception, in deciding what is fair.
Where a use clearly contributes to the ‘value gap’ – a significant effect
on the ‘value of’ the work - courts should be more cautious about treating it
as fair. They should take care to include the work’s value as a ‘draw’ in their
consideration of the fourth fair use factor (and copyright owners should take
care to lead evidence as to this attention-harvesting value when litigating fair
use issues). The commerciality or attention-harvesting character of the use,
should not, of course, lead to a presumption of unfairness, but it should be
given due attention in the application of the fair use factors.
2.2.2 Proposed further expansions of fair use
With a clearer sense now of the ways in which even relatively narrow
expansions of fair use may amplify the power of dominant internet platforms,
let us now turn to the more radical proposals described at the beginning of
this section.
Let us start with the recommendation of including all imaginative uses
within the purview of fair use. The benefit of extending fair use further, to
encompass all imaginative uses of works is obviously that it would distribute
the right to engage with works creatively in a far more inclusive way. But,
like the expansion of transformative use doctrine to encompass orthogonal
uses, this expansion of fair use would involve trade-offs.
As with orthogonal uses, internet platforms that profit from attracting
‘eyeballs’ and collecting data are well served by treating all imaginative uses
as fair and non-infringing of copyright. Proliferation of non-commercial,
imaginative uses of works would presumably drive traffic on internet
intermediaries’ platforms, and traffic is their currency. Concentrating user
attention on free content is extremely profitable for businesses like Google;
not least because it permits the gathering of valuable data about those
individuals that can then be used to sell advertising, or even for the purposes
of propaganda. They profit and develop the information asymmetries
described in the previous part, not only on the back of copyright works
themselves, but also from the public’s creative engagements with copyright
works.
It is businesses like Google, on that scale, which have the resources to
conduct mass copying and data analysis exercises, extracting valuable data
about the public in the process. It is businesses of that size that can be
confident of having the resources to defend copyright suits and make a case
for fair use. Smaller businesses are not on the same footing. Structural
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asymmetries would compound. That would an indirect structural
consequence of treating all imaginative uses as fair.
What about the direct consequences? It is not clear, even where direct
consequences are concerned, that a broad ‘imaginative use’ exception would
in every case involve a redistribution of cultural power away from large
commercial organizations and toward individual authors or non-commercial
users of works.
It would not always be the ‘little man’ who would benefit from relying
on the exceptions. Commercial businesses might, by applying a minimum of
creative imagination to works created by amateurs or independent authors,
find themselves in a position where they could profit without paying authors.
There are already examples of successful commercial publications like
Buzzfeed disregarding copyright and reproducing and publishing
photographs and other works created by amateurs, in ‘listicles’ without
attribution or authorization.198 And Facebook already derives enormous
profits from using all of the content, created by all of its users, without
payment to them.
An ‘imaginative use’ exception therefore seems to me just as likely to
produce a less inclusive distribution of communicative power as to produce
a more inclusive one, even if on its face, it would give formal recognition to
a universal right of free imagination.
As for the recommendation of an inverted burden of proof in fair use,
this would at first glance appear to empower the public vis-à-vis copyright
owners. The right to use works, especially for non-commercial purposes,
would appear to be very inclusively distributed under such an arrangement.
At a structural level, however, such a development would be liable to
compound inequalities in communicative power and opportunity.
Fair use exceptions are already problematic in so far as their application
is uncertain. In the face of uncertainty about whether any given use is fair,
wealthy, established businesses can afford to pay for copyright advice, and
even to risk copyright infringement. They can defend a suit or respond to a
threat of litigation effectively. Moreover, risk-averse, established
commercial copyright owners are better placed than independent authors or
ordinary individuals to pay license fees. If they do not wish to take the risk
that a use may be held not to be a fair use, they can simply price in copyright

198. Joe Veix, BuzzFeed Stole My Article, So I’m Stealing it Back, DEATH AND TAXES,
http://www.deathandtaxesmag.com/207291/buzzfeed-stole-my-article-so-im-stealing-it-back/. (last
visited Apr 30, 2014); Dan Catt, 10 Good Reasons BuzzFeed Is Going to Pay My Invoice for Copyright
Theft, SLATE, 2013, http://www.slate.com/. (last visited Apr 30, 2014).
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license fees. Independent authors, smaller content businesses or ordinary
members of the public do not have the same security.199
Now, inverting the burden of proof in fair use does not remove the
uncertainty. It does, however, increase copyright enforcement costs. Raising
the marginal cost of copyright enforcement may reduce some enforcement
action, and therefore decrease the risk of engaging creatively with copyright
works – which is a structural gain for inclusiveness. But the effect of this
increase in enforcement cost / decrease in risk for creative engagement with
works is not flat. It is likely to impact copyright owners and users differently,
and one key vector of difference will be the resources available to them.
All enforcement or defense costs will favor incumbents in creative
industries over newcomers, powerful and wealthy operators over smaller
ones. This is one of the key insights of the cultural turn, and the
‘concentration critique’ of copyright that I mentioned in the introduction to
this article.
Wealthy commercial media businesses are at an advantage in obtaining
and enforcing rights, over independent creators, smaller businesses, and noncommercial creator-users. Copyright industry incumbents can afford to
enforce their copyrights through legal action; and can afford to pay license
fees when they need to use others’ copyrights.
Moreover, highly integrated media conglomerates will already have a
large body of material over which they have copyrights: and which they can
therefore re-use without having to pay license fees. The more extensive their
commercial infrastructure (of marketing and market intelligence, for
example), the greater their advantage in exploiting digital technology to
engage in price discrimination and strategic product bundling.200
The same may not be said for newer entrants to the market, for whom
search and transaction costs of licensing (not to mention the actual license
fees) may be prohibitive.201 Copyright causes these costs, and in this respect
may be said to discourage diverse and robust engagements with existing
material.
Worse, the cost of enforcing copyright hits small-time authors and
publishers the hardest—so their capacity to derive copyright revenue is

199. On the impact of this uncertainty with respect to visual arts, see Amy Adler, Fair Use and the
Future of Art, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. (2016).
200. Loren, supra note 16 at 384; Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use, supra note 14 at 401408; NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein 28 (2001).
201. Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use, supra note 14 at 410. See Elkin-Koren, supra note
2 at 384, where she observes that this distributive effect hinders individuals engaging in creative
activity.
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severely curtailed in comparison with larger businesses.202The asymmetry in
enforcement power only compounds the advantage of larger, more
established copyright businesses. Big commercial intermediaries are well
positioned to ensure they make money from their copyright; independent
authors and small copyright businesses are not. The upshot is that
inclusiveness and diversity are likely to suffer, since one specific group
(large scale media producers, ownership of which is highly concentrated)
enjoys a substantial advantage over the rest of the potentially communicating
public.203
These insights bear on the question of whether to raise copyright
enforcement costs by inverting the onus of proof with respect to fair use. The
higher the costs of enforcing copyright, the more incumbents and large
businesses are at an advantage relative to independent authors and
publishers. An inverted burden of proof may increase the security of creative
re-users of works relative to copyright owners. However, as between
incumbent, wealthy copyright owners, and smaller scale copyright owners
(who are, incidentally, more likely to be independent authors, rather than
intermediary businesses), it is likely to entrench their already existing
disparity in communicative power.
For all these reasons, it is better not to treat all imaginative uses as fair,
or to invert the burden of proof in fair use. The transformativeness of a use
already weighs very significantly in the fair use calculus, and this gives
imaginative uses of works considerable prospects of being fair. But the other
fair use factors must also be given proper consideration, because otherwise,
the distributive consequences of any given use fail to register. In other words,
while the fair use exception in its current form does give rise to some
uncertainty, it is preferable to a fair use doctrine that turned only on the
question of the users’ imaginative contribution, or in which there was an
inverted burden of proof.
2.3 Platform liability and content filtering
So much for my analysis of the structural significance of expanding
copyright exceptions and limitations. What about expanding copyright
owners’ rights?
Let me now turn to a controversial measure which is explicitly
calculated to enhance copyright owners’ rights with respect to dominant

202.
203.

NETANEL, supra note 2 at 119ff.
NETANEL, supra note 200 at 28.
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online platforms, and to redress the ‘value gap’ described above.204 As I said,
the purpose of doing so is to show that my structural approach does not
necessarily mandate copyright ‘maximalism’. Efforts to ‘strengthen’ the
position of copyright owners vis-a-vis online platforms, and to expand the
scope of copyright owners’ exclusive rights, may, perversely, further cement
the communicative and cultural power of dominant online platforms. They
may also entrench existing market hierarchies that characterize copyrightbased content economies.
The European Union’s Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single
Market introduces a number of copyright reforms. Article 17 (Article 13 in
earlier drafts of the directive) is one of the most controversial.205 Article 17
provides that member states of the European Union must legislate so that
for-profit online content-sharing service providers (e.g. video sharing
websites like YouTube) will be liable as publishers of the content posted by
their users. They will now be required to obtain copyright licenses in order
to continue to host copyright content posted by their users.
Safe harbor exceptions, which previously applied to online services
which operated as a ‘mere conduit’ for the posting of copyright content will
no longer apply in relation to these content-sharing platforms. An alternative,
sui generis notice and takedown regime will, however, permit contentsharing platforms to avoid liability with respect to infringing content if they
can show they have:
• made best efforts to secure a copyright license;
• made best efforts (in accordance with high industry standards)
to ensure the unavailability of specific works and subject matter
identified by copyright rightsholders;
• acted expeditiously to remove infringing content on receiving
sufficiently substantiated notice from rightsholders; and
• made best efforts to prevent future uploads of such content.
There is certainly a prima facie structural case for making content sharing
platforms liable for infringing content posted by their users. There is merit
in trying to remediate the ‘value gap’. But the strength of the structural case
for Article 17 will ultimately depend on how the process of licensing
copyright content to platforms plays out.
I will reflect here on possible outcomes of this process. The object of
doing so is not to attempt to predict exactly how Article 17 will affect the
204. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
205. Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market.
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cultural landscape, nor to analyze exhaustively the precise doctrinal or
practical details of regimes that might emerge under Article 17. Rather, it is
to illustrate the structural issues at stake, and the ways in which they should
inform our thinking about such measures.
2.3.1 The most hopeful possibility for the implementation of Article
17
Let us begin with the most hopeful possibility. One possible outcome
of Article 17 is that most platforms conclude copyright licenses with most
copyright owners, with respect to most or all of the content which users post
to those platforms. If this comes about, then Article 17 would in some
measure mitigate the problem of concentration of wealth and communicative
power in the hands of dominant online platforms. Given the vast amount of
material uploaded to platforms like YouTube, this would likely require some
form of blanket or collective licensing (a point I will return to). A licensing
regime that effectively covered all content posted on user generated
platforms distribute communicative power and wealth more evenly between
platforms, copyright owners, and end-users. Platforms would share some of
their wealth with copyright owners, while end-users would still be free to
participate in the marketplace of ideas and enjoy the experience of creative
appropriation.
In this very positive scenario, there would also be improvements to the
incentive structures that shape the investment of time and resources into
creative content. Currently, there is no clear incentive for copyright
businesses to distribute content in formats which facilitate non-commercial
end-users to ‘remix’ it or otherwise creatively engage with it.206 Indeed,
proponents of the cultural turn have worried a great deal about copyright
owners using technological protection measures to prevent legitimate
creative re-uses of works.207 If copyright owners could reliably expect to
derive good licensing revenue from user generated content platforms,
however, they would have an incentive to facilitate, rather than block
creative uses.
Expected license revenue from user creativity might produce a more
economically rational management of resources, which better aligned

206. But see David Lindsay, Franchises, Imaginary Worlds, Authorship and Fandom, LAW AND
CREATIVITY IN THE AGE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT FRANCHISE, at 66, where he argues that copyright
businesses have an interest in engaging fans in an ‘exchange of meanings’ and cultivating creative uses
of copyright works by fans.
207. See e.g Fisher III, supra note 2 at 1233; Lessig, supra note 2 at 62; Netanel, supra note 2 at
66-70.
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copyright owner incentives with the value that end-users derive from
engaging creatively with works.208 The benefits of this would go beyond the
merely economic. If copyright businesses can make more money from
providing content in formats that makes creative re-use easy, they would be
more likely to supply works in those formats. This in turn would reduce
existing friction for creative re-use of works: the friction generated by the
inconvenience of formats that do not lend themselves to users’ creative
engagement.
For example, record labels do not tend to release the unmastered ‘stems’
making up sound recordings. Instead, they release fully mastered tracks in
stereo. The casual remixer has two tracks to play with rather than then 8, 10,
or 20 that have been mixed and mastered together to create the final mastered
recording. This means that the casual, non-commercial remixer is not well
positioned to extract single tracks—say a baseline or drumbeat—and do
something creative with them. If record labels could reliably make licensing
revenue from fan remixes and mashups posted on user generated platforms,
they might be more open to releasing stems. There is, in other words, a
potential for tremendous gains in inclusiveness.
2.3.2 A more pessimistic view of Article 17
Unfortunately, the prospect of all platforms achieving successful
licensing deals with all copyright owners, with respect to all content
uploaded by users, seems fairly remote—at least if the licensing process is
left to private ordering. Platforms like YouTube and copyright owners have
not hitherto managed comprehensive licensing deals. Merely increasing the
leverage of copyright owners by holding platforms liable for infringing
content posted by users is not a sure path to bringing about such deals.
What seems likely is that platforms and copyright owners will achieve
some patchwork of licensing deals covering some but not all content posted
by users. Various possible scenarios spring to mind.
In one scenario, online user generated content platforms such as
YouTube might successfully conclude licenses with large multimedia large
multimedia organizations, but not with smaller scale creators and content
businesses. The latter will be lower in their list of priorities and dealing with
each successively will at the very least take a very long time, and involve
high transaction costs.

208. For a useful gloss of the theory that copyright’s role is to facilitate, above all, economically
rational management of creative resources, see e.g. A. Barron, Copyright infringement,’free-riding’ and
the lifeworld, LSE LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS 17/2008 at 14 (2008).
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In another scenario, platforms like YouTube might fail to secure
licenses for a significant proportion of copyright material which their users
tend to upload without authorization; or there might be a delay while licenses
were negotiated; perhaps a delay of years. Much about these scenarios seem
to me quite problematic from a structural point of view.
The first scenario would be a win of sorts for end users, because it
would mean that their non-commercial creative engagements with a large
body of content (the commercial catalogues of big content owners) could
proceed without risk of blocking or takedown.
Smaller content providers and independent creators would seem,
however, to be at a substantial disadvantage in the licensing of their material
to online platforms. They would likely have less negotiating power, less
know-how in the business of licensing, and less time and resources to devote
to securing licenses with platforms than the larger players. disparities in
bargaining power translate into disparities in communicative power.
Assuming success in licensing content to large online platforms correlates
roughly to the size and bargaining power of content businesses, we could
expect smaller players either not to make any money at all from user
generated content (if they haven’t concluded licenses) or making less money
(assuming they conclude less favorable licenses than larger players). If they
haven’t concluded licenses, they will have costs that larger businesses do
not, because they will need to spend time and money on copyright claims or
takedown notices.
In other words, smaller businesses will likely derive less copyright
income from licenses with user generated content platforms than larger
business and have higher copyright enforcement costs. That means less
money and time to spend on creating and disseminating content; which
means less voice. In other words, we are likely to see existing cultural and
communicative hierarchies continue in a scenario where platforms conclude
licenses with large copyright businesses preferentially to small copyright
businesses. The ‘concentration problem’ in the political economy of
copyright, of which cultural turn theorists are so critical, would be likely to
persist.
The second scenario is more worrying still. This is the scenario where
platforms do not obtain suitable copyright licenses for a very large
proportion of content, or at least experience a delay in obtaining licenses. In
this scenario, platforms would be obliged to take down infringing material,
upon receiving a proper notice from the copyright owner, and to use best
efforts and ‘industry standard’ measure to remove and prevent new uploads
of infringing content also concerning.
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Earlier drafts of Art. 17 specifically suggested the use of content filters
and blockers as a means of meeting the best efforts and industry standard
requirements.209 It is not unreasonable to expect that this is what will be
required to meet the ‘high industry standards’. Given the sheer amount of
content posted by users, the most straightforward way for platforms to avoid
liability for infringing content is to use upload filters to prevent the posting,
especially with respect to content for which they have already received
takedown notices.
Even if Art. 17 does not, in its final form, mandate the use of content
blocking and upload filters, the imposition of liability on platforms creates a
strong pressure to implement such measures. Essentially, Art. 17 creates a
notice and takedown regime similar to existing regimes such as that applying
under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, but with additional
problems associated with content blocking, and a higher risk of liability for
online platforms.
Let me first deal with the implications of making platforms responsible
for active content blocking, before I turn to ways in which notice and
takedown regimes tend to allocate power as between incumbent content
businesses, and newcomers or smaller players.
By making platforms liable for infringing content posted by users,
Article 17 makes them responsible for active content gatekeeping. It is not
clear to me that this produces a net reduction in the structural asymmetries
that exist between dominant content platforms, and everyone else, when it
comes to cultural and communicative power. In the previous part, I showed
that dominant online platforms already exercise a form of curatorial power
over the contents of a very large portion of the marketplace of ideas. Placing
direct responsibility for removing and blocking harmful content in their
hands seems likely to further entrench them as gatekeepers and curators.
Platform gatekeeping, especially automated content blocking, tends to
involve fairly arbitrary judgments about whether certain content is infringing
(or harmful, or fake news, or whatever)—especially if blocking is automated.
Dominant online platforms have no particular reason to exercise their
enormous power in the public interest. They are, of course, not inherently
malevolent, but they are beholden to shareholders and the businesses that
buy data and ad space from them. Free expression, diversity and
inclusiveness are not their priorities, and they are not the priorities of
automate content filtering and blocking algorithms.

209. See e.g. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright
in the Digital Single Market—COM (2016)593, Art. 13.
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There is another structural wrinkle, which complicates matters further.
The current leaders in content identification, filtering and blocking
technology happen to be Google, or rather, Alphabet, the company that owns
Google. Alphabet owns YouTube, which implements a system called
ContentID. ContentID identifies when video and audio content has been
reproduced. Currently, copyright owners can choose what happens when a
work uploaded to YouTube by another user triggers a ContentID match with
their copyright work. They can either block matching content, share some of
the advertising revenue with the uploader of the matching video, or simply
monitor the video’s viewership statistics.210 Alphabet has invested more than
$100 million in the development of Content ID’s and the technology is
already used by more than 9,000 copyright owners and content businesses
globally. 211
So, while the introduction of various forms of content of blocking and
upload filtering is likely to be disruptive to YouTube, they have a sufficient
buffer to withstand the disruption, and already have the infrastructure to
implement these measures. Not so, the smaller players in the online-content
sharing universe, such as the artwork community DeviantArt or
controversial social media sites such as 4Chan and VOAT.212 If they are to
implement content blocking technology, they will probably have to pay
already-dominant platforms for the privilege.213 So money and power flows
away from smaller sites toward the larger platforms.
There is already an oligopoly over the means of filtration for the
purposes of finding and ordering content. It seems quite possible that
implementing direct forms of content regulation which require or encourage
content filtering would result in a monopoly or oligopoly over the means for
filtration for the purposes of blocking content, as less-dominant platforms
were forced to rely on filtering technologies developed by larger ones. This
210. How Content ID works - YouTube Help,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en. (last visited Aug 8, 2019).
211. Gian Volpicelli, Don’t Believe the Hype: Article 13 is Great News for YouTube, WIRED UK,
2019, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/article-13-youtube-what-next. (last visited May 2, 2019).
212. Id. See also Pamela Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto, The Enigma of Digitized Property: A
Tribute to John Perry Barlow, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 103 (2019).
213. Article 17(5) does contain a ‘proportionality principle’, which brings into consideration
matters such as the size of a content-sharing service, the availability and cost of suitable and effective
means of taking down and preventing the upload of content. However, if Alphabet made software such
as ContentID commercially available for a reasonable cost, smaller platforms might not be able to avoid
content blocking obligations merely on the basis of their size and the relative cost of such measures.
There would therefore be strong pressure on these platforms to pay Alphabet for a license to ContentID
or some related software. In other words, if the effect of Article 17 is to pressure online content-sharing
platforms into content blocking as a matter of standard practice, the result might be to further compound
the structural advantages of dominant online platforms.
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would be bad for inclusiveness and diversity of voices in the marketplace of
ideas.
Let us turn now to the effect of content blocking and filtering on the
distribution of communicative power as between copyright businesses and
users (leaving aside, for a moment, the issue of concentration of cultural
power in the hands of dominant platforms). A recent case study of contested
takedown notices on YouTube, documented in a series of articles on the
IPKat blog, illustrates some of these problems well.
A popular YouTuber, with the moniker MumboJumbo, received a
torrent of automated takedown notices with respect to his videos, which
contained 4 seconds of sampled music at the beginning and end. To
complicate matters, the sample is not a sound recording owned by the
claimant (Warner Chappell), but instead itself contains a sample from a
recording in which the claimant own copyright. Claims arrived in Mumbo
Jumbo’s email inbox at a rate of 30 per minute, with a total of 400 claims.214
Let us leave aside the legal merits of any of the notices and, instead,
consider day to day practicalities. Let us assume that some or all of Mumbo
Jumbo’s videos do not in fact infringe copyright. Unfortunately for Mumbo
Jumbo, he cannot defend or dispute the claims automatically, or deal with
them at anything like the speed at which they arrived. Any effort to contest
claims, or even remove the offending content in the interim, must on his part
be manual. He describes the process of responding to claims as follows:
“myself and my girlfriend, Vicky have been going through all of my videos
on the YouTube Editor and manually removing all of the intros.” Then he
has to file individual disputes for each claim using YouTube’s dispute
resolution mechanism. According to him, each such effort takes one or two
minutes. As a consequence, disputing all the claims could take him up to
twelve hours: a full workday for his one-man content business.215
The Mumbo Jumbo story illustrates, first of all, that the notice and take
down procedure may be abused; or even used in good faith, but in such a
way as to target uses that ought to be considered non-infringing. It is
extremely difficult to calibrate filters in such a way as to prevent lawful
content from being blocked along with unlawful content. For example, we
cannot reliably expect an automated blocking filter to be able to recognize
uses of copyright work that should properly be considered to be fair dealing
or fair use—such as parody, satire or other transformative uses.
214. Thomas Key, Sampling Mumbo Jumbo: Minecraft YouTuber Receives Copyright Claims on
Hundreds of Videos in a Matter of Hours, THE IPKAT, http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/06/samplingmumbo-jumbo-minecraft-youtuber.html. (last visited Jun 7, 2019).
215. Id.
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The story also shows how small content businesses are at a
disadvantage to larger ones when it comes to contesting take down notices,
and otherwise dealing with situations where filters or content removal
systems takedown or block content. Granted, both existing DMCA
procedure, and the procedures that would be implemented by the EU
directive, leave scope for appealing and reversing take downs on the basis
that the content in question does not infringe copyright, or falls under an
exception such as fair use or fair dealing.
But those without the wherewithal to understand their rights under such
exceptions are liable simply to concede to a takedown notice, even where it
pertains to a use that is not in fact infringing. The people likely to be in this
situation are individual, independent authors and non-commercial users. It is
likely, then, that the least profitable uses—by individual users—are the most
readily subjected to enforcement. Even if they do contest notices, as Mumbo
Jumbo did, the time cost of going through the procedure for doing so hits
small operators the hardest.
Now, simply raising barriers to making copyright claims or issuing
takedown notices does not necessarily resolve the problem satisfactorily.
YouTube’s copyright claims policy is not all calibrated in favor of copyright
owners. The platform has recently revised its copyright system for manual
copyright claims.216 Claimants must now specify the portion of videos
alleged to be infringing with a timestamp. The benefit of this requirement is
that alleged infringers will be better placed to defend against spurious claims.
The problem is, the measure will increase copyright enforcement costs.
Issuing a takedown notice or claim on a platform’s claim system is, to be
sure, cheaper than full-blown copyright litigation, even with the additional
step of including a time stamp. But a less acute version of the enforcement
cost and concentration problems (which I described in discussing fair use
above) still persists under notice and take down regimes.
The structural consequences are predictable. Independent creators and
small content businesses are the least well placed to submit a compliant
notice in order to get genuinely infringing content taken down; while larger
players have more resources to devote to the continuous work of finding
infringing content and issuing takedown notices. At the same time,
YouTube, is taking control of how copyright works (de facto if not de jure),
thus arrogating another form of cultural power to itself, and away from
policy-makers who are accountable to the public.
216. Thomas Key, Guest Post: YouTube Shifts the Burden: Requires Manual Copyright Claimants
to Timestamp the Allegedly Infringing Material; Simplifies the Rectification Process - The IPKat,
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/07/guest-post-youtube-shifts-burden.html. (last visited Aug 8, 2019).
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2.3.3 The challenge for implementing Article 17
The challenge for EU members states in implementing Article 17 is to
ensure that licensing of content plays out as closely to ‘the most hopeful
possibility’ that I described above. The outcome to aim for is one in which
as much content as possible—preferably all content—is licensed, on
basically the same terms for all copyright owners.
Now, the copyright directive does leave the door open to such an
outcome. Article 12 of the directive provides that EU member states may
extend the operation of licensing agreements concluded by collective
management organizations (on behalf of member copyright owners) to apply
to copyright rightsholders who have not themselves authorized those
organizations to act on their behalf. This extension of licensing agreements
is only permissible when obtaining individual authorizations from
rightsholders is so impractical and onerous as to make licensing by way of
private ordering unlikely.217 Another key condition is that all rightsholders
should be guaranteed equal treatment, including in relation to the terms of
the license.
It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the details of practically
implementing such a licensing regime. What is of interest here are the
broader structural issues at play. Let me briefly sketch them out.
The case of content uploaded on user generated content platforms
would seem to fit squarely within the set of limited circumstances
contemplated by Article 12. As I have been arguing, it would be very
difficult for platforms to obtain licenses for every piece of content posted by
users; and the difficulty would seem to be the most severe with respect to
content owned by copyright owners with the fewest resources.218
In effect, measures implemented by EU member states under article 12
would overcome this difficulty by putting in place a form of compulsory,
blanket licensing, administered by collective rights management
organizations. Extended or compulsory licenses of this kind seem to be a
promising avenue for balancing the range of structural problems that I have
been considering in this article.
A successful implementation of Article 12, with respect to rights on
content posted on user generated platforms, has the potential to ameliorate,
to some degree, some of the imbalance of wealth and power derived from
the exploitation of content online. It has the potential to ameliorate the

217.
218.

Art 12(2).
See also Samuelson and Hashimoto, supra note 212 at 111.
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concentration problem produced by both copyright and by free content
economies online.
A licensing regime under Article 12 could operate to share with
copyright owners some of the concentrated wealth and communicative
power accrued by dominant internet platforms through the exploitation of
copyright works. Such a licensing regime could disrupt, in some measure,
the zero-price content model which helps to underwrite that dominance.219
By guaranteeing remuneration for copyright owners, it would help to furnish
them with the means to maintain some independence and voice in the broader
cultural and discursive sphere, and help to ensure the persistence of multiple
nodes of communicative power in the public sphere.220
Extended collective licensing under Article 12 might also go some way
to remediating copyright’s concentration problem, which arises in part as a
result of the asymmetrical impact of the costs of licensing, enforcing
copyright, and defending copyright claims. It could help to neutralize the
relative advantage of incumbents over newcomers and smaller copyright
owners, because receiving copyright income would no longer be dependent
on having the wherewithal to conclude profitable licensing agreements or to
take effective copyright enforcement action.
Likewise, the specter of automated content blocking, and all of its
associated problems, could be avoided. As I have pointed out, the costs of
automated content blocking are likely to be distributed asymmetrically. If all
content posted on platforms would, as a matter of course, fall under an
extended collective license, this asymmetry would become irrelevant,
because there would be no need to block content. By the same token, the
frictions standing in the way of users engaging creatively with copyright
content would be reduced, which would be a win for inclusiveness.
I do not intend to suggest that Article 12, or compulsory licensing
regimes for content on user generated content platforms, will solve all the
structural problems appurtenant to copyright markets or online information
economies. On brief consideration, however, such regimes do seem
promising vehicles for dealing with some of the structural problems that I
have been discussing. At the very least, there is a case for further
consideration and analysis of such measures, applying a qualitative,
structural approach of the kind that I have advocated in this article.

219. See above, part 1.4.
220. Netanel emphasizes the need for ‘bubbles of varied wealth and power’ to maintain robust
public discourse, and to prevent a small group of dominant voices from drowning out the rest. See
Netanel, Market Hierarchy, supra note 14 at 1919-1920.
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CONCLUSION
Over the past 25 years, the cultural turn in copyright scholarship has
amply demonstrated that there is more to copyright than merely balancing
incentives to create against the need for access to works. The qualitative,
cultural effects of the law matter. If we truly believe that copyright law
should be calibrated to promote ‘progress’, then we should take into account
its effects on the distribution of cultural and communicative power; on
democratic discourse and individual self-authorship; and on the
inclusiveness and diversity of the cultural milieu. The cultural turn has
produced a rich and productive normative framework for evaluating the legal
and institutional parameters that organize and shape creative activity.
If we take this framework seriously, however, we are compelled to
reconsider the combination of copyright pessimism and internet optimism
that has been characteristic of cultural turn thinking. Proponents of the
cultural turn who were concerned about copyright’s role in concentrating
cultural power should also be concerned about the concentration problems
in online information economies in which copying and sharing proceeds
more freely. If they were concerned that the commercial incentives under
copyright regimes privileged bland and homogeneous content, they should
also be concerned about the troubling incentives in play in online extractive
attention economies.
It is not my intention, having described some of the more dystopian
features of the networked communication environment, to write off its
benefits entirely. Not everything about the internet is tarnished by the race
to capture attention, and by the concentration of platform ownership. Clearly
there are benefits to facilitating wide, low-cost participation in culture and
discourse, and in disrupting existing mass market structures of
communicative power. There are more works in circulation, and more people
who can create, access them and use them, more easily (more inclusiveness).
People are contributing to culture and discourse for more diverse audiences,
and with a wider range of motivations (more diversity).
I can hardly imagine researching and writing this article without
Google’s remarkable search engine, its Google Scholar application, and its
Googlebooks collection. I also came across many helpful news articles that
I would otherwise never have seen in my Facebook and Twitter news feeds.
The dominant internet applications of which I have been so relentlessly
critical have undoubtedly helped me in my research and writing, and in that
respect have enhanced my authorship (and self-authorship).
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But the point I want to make is that the benefits of the ‘free’ networked
communication environment are (like the democracy-enhancing features of
the copyright-mediated communication sphere identified by Netanel)
qualified and contingent. They are not guaranteed and universal. Creating
conditions in which copying and sharing proceeds more freely, does not by
itself prevent concentration of communicative power and attendant
qualitative problems; and seems, in certain cases, to worsen these problems.
There are trade-offs involved. This has hitherto been insufficiently
acknowledged in copyright literature and scholarship.
Both copyright and non-copyright systems produce inclusiveness and
diversity problems, just as each has some advantages for inclusiveness and
diversity. In both copyright markets and online non-copyright systems,
perverse incentives reward bland or sensationalist content. Both online and
off, and in copyright and networked-peer-production systems, a small group
of powerful platforms hold a disturbing amount of power of the contents and
character of the marketplace of ideas. Developments in the law effect the
broader organization of expressive activity and have the potential to entrench
existing hierarchies and incentives; or to change them for the better.
This may so whether they appear, on their face, to ‘weaken’ or to
‘expand’ the strength or scope of copyright. As I’ve shown, expanding
exceptions such as fair use, which would seem to enhance the
communicative and creative opportunities of ordinary individuals, may at the
same time help to increase the power of dominant internet platforms. That
power is, in some respects, power over the very individuals whose creative
horizons have been expanded: they trade off one gain in self-authorship
against another kind of loss. By the same token, strengthening copyright
owners’ formal exclusive rights with respect to online platforms may fail to
meaningfully change the power dynamics as between copyright owners and
platforms; or between incumbents and newcomers in content businesses.
In assessing developments in copyright law, we should try to think
afresh about existing structures of communicative power and opportunity
across the whole cultural landscape, and the likely effects of regulatory
intervention on those structures. Such an approach demands a unified picture
of the structural and qualitative challenges that affect the marketplace of
ideas and the cultural and creative spheres, whether under the auspices of
copyright or in free content economies.
The challenge for future scholarship is to better our understanding of
where copyright fits into a broader information and cultural policy. We
should try to work out how to bring copyright law, media ownership law and
content regulation, competition law, internet law, and (of course) day to day
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practice in line, working together to try to address asymmetries of cultural
power, and their distorting effects on self-authorship and democracy.
We may not be able to attain a ‘perfect’ cultural landscape (as if such a
thing could exist). We should, however, build on the insights of the cultural
turn: to work out where the public benefit lies; to understand it in rich
qualitative terms; and to keep pursuing what improvements we can. We will
need to remain open to continuous evaluation and adjustment of our
expectations and about different systems for organizing creativity, even
those which may once have seemed very promising, such as online free
content economies.

